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ABSTRACT
Mood congruent memory (MCM) in depressed 
individuals, tends to be biased toward memories 
consistent with their mood, i.e. negative or unpleasant 
memories. Although MCM is a robust finding (cf.
Blaney, 1986), the large majority of studies have used 
free-recall paradigms, and that methodology does little 
to delineate the cognitive mechanisms determining MCM. 
This study was designed to investigate whether MCM bias 
is a function of implicit or explicit memory. Implicit 
memory is taken as a measure of the organization or 
strength of association of the aspects of a memory 
representation, whereas explicit memory also taps 
elaboration that may involve control procedures such as 
retrieval strategies. Thus a comparison of implicit and 
explicit MCM bias may provide important information 
about the involvement of the structure of the memory 
representation, or the involvement of elaboration 
processes in MCM.
Two groups, a group of clinical depressives and a 
comparison group, were studied. Each group engaged in 
an encoding task involving words of varying affective 
valence. Following this encoding task, all subjects 
engaged in an explicit memory task (cued recall), and an 
implicit memory test (word completion). As expected, a
vi i
MCM bias was found in explicit memory, however, contrary 
to predictions, no MCM bias was found in implicit 
memory. This finding was interpreted as supporting the 
involvement of elaborative mechanisms in MCM. A second 
finding showed that MCM was found with depression items 
but not with physical threat words. Thus, the MCM bias 
in explicit memory is somewhat specific to information 
that is congruent with depression rather than to all 
negativistic information.
IMPLICIT VERSUS EXPLICIT MEMORY BIAS IN DEPRESSION
Clinical depression is a pervasive and serious 
affective disorder (Amenson & Lewinsohn, 1979; Lehman, 
1971; Miles, 1977; National Institute of Mental Health, 
1970). Some have observed cognitive distortions or 
negativistic automatic thinking to be frequent 
correlates of depression. Aaron Beck (1963; 1964; 1967) 
has proposed that this style of thinking is the crucial 
facet of depression. He submits that emotion and 
thought are intimately connected and that if one has a 
maladaptive thought about an event, this thought will 
result in a maladaptive emotional reaction.
While it is true that negativistic thinking and 
irrational beliefs have been found to be associated with 
depression (e.g. Beck, 1967; Buchwald, 1977; Cook & 
Peterson, 1986; Gotlib, 1981; 1983; Lewinsohn, Larson & 
Munoz, 1978; Munoz, 1977), it has not been shown that 
this style of thinking is necessarily a precursor to 
depression. This aspect of Beck’s theory has been 
criticized in the literature (e.g. Coyne & Gotlib,
1983). Lewinsohn, Steinmetz, Larson, and Franklin 
(1981), conducted a large scale longitudinal study to 
test whether a negative cognitive style may predict 
clinical depression. Their results showed that
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depression-related cognitions occurred concomitantly 
with depression, rather than before the depressive 
episode. Other studies supported these results in that 
cognitive distortions have been found to be the result 
of depression rather than the cause (Hamilton &
Abramson, 1983; Persons & Rao, 1985; Silverman,
Silverman, & Eardley, 1984).
Though there is not strong support for negative 
cognitive distortions as the critical etiological factor 
in depression, this does not necessarily imply that 
depression-related cognitions are only symptoms of the 
disorder. It is possible that while the negative 
affective state tends to cause these cognitions, these 
negative thoughts may in turn serve to maintain this 
emotional state. Research has shown that sad affect can 
be induced by encouraging a subject to engage negative 
thoughts such as "I have too many bad things in my life" 
(Teasdale & Bancroft, 1977; Velten, 1968). Also, the 
Lewinsohn et al. (1981) prospective study of depression
found that the extent of negativistic thinking predicted 
duration of the depressive episode. Beck has suggested 
that depression should be treated by teaching the 
patient to monitor and rebut their negativistic thinking 
(Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979). This treatment 
approach has been shown to be very effective (e.g. Rush,
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Khatami, & Beck, 1975; Kovacs & Rush, 1976) and has 
fared well compared to antidepressant treatments 
(Blackburn, Bishop, Glen, Whally, & Christie, 1981; 
McLean & Hakistian, 1979; Rush, Beck, Kovacs, & Hollon,
1977). While it is true that the effectiveness of 
cognitive therapy does not necessarily imply that Beck’ 
notions about the etiology of depression are accurate, 
it is possible that cognitive therapy may be effective 
by redirecting the depressed person away from negative 
thoughts which maintain or exacerbate the depression. 
Thus, it may be that these thoughts are important 
depression maintenance factors and this explanation may 
account for the success of Beck’s treatment with 
depress ion.
Information Processing And Depression
While the cognitive therapy approach has claimed 
alliance with information processing psychology (e.g. 
Murray & Jacobson, 1978; Mahoney & Arnkoff, 1978), unti 
recently their research bore little resemblance to that 
of cognitive science. Lately however, the information 
processing paradigm has been applied to various 
emotional disorders including depression. Much of this 
research has been organized around the approach of
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Gordon Bower and his associative network theory of 
memory.
Bower’s model (Bower, 1981), which is also known as 
the "spreading activation model" of memory, contains 
several basic postulates. First Bower proposes that 
memory is composed of cognitive networks of associated 
concepts and descriptive propositions. Thus, various 
memories are associated with each other, and with 
descriptive statements about these memories. Secondly, 
each memory unit (i.e. memory) is composed of a cluster 
of components entitled "nodes". Bower goes on to submit 
that "Each distinct emotion...has a specific node or 
unit in memory" (Bower, 1981, p. 135). These are called 
"primitive emotion nodes”. Each of these emotion nodes 
is linked with propositions that describe events from an 
individual’s life during which that particular emotion 
is aroused. These emotion nodes may be activated by 
many stimuli, either physiological or symbolic-verbal. 
Further, Bower states that when an emotion node is 
activated above a threshold level, this node transmits 
excitation to those nodes where that emotion’s specific 
autonomic arousal and expressive behavior are 
controlled. Finally, the activation of an emotion node 
spreads excitement throughout the memory structures to 
which it is connected, according to Bower. Thus, an
Mood Congruent Memory 
emotion node will maintain activation of this emotion. 
When an emotion node is activated this influences which 
memories will later be retrieved.
Memory Research in Depression
One of the predictions of Bower’s theory is that 
recall of information may be dependent on mood. This 
prediction is an extension of state dependent-learning. 
Information that is encoded while the subject is in a 
particular mood (or when this emotion node is activated 
above a threshold level ) will be better remembered when 
the subject is once again experiencing this mood than a 
mood not experienced during encoding. This proposed 
phenomena is called mood dependent recall (MDR). The 
hedonic valence (pleasant, unpleasant) of the 
information is irrelevant. All that is required is that 
the same emotion be present at encoding and recall, and 
the information received while first experiencing this 
emotion will be more likely to be recalled than 
information aquired while experiencing a discordant 
emotion, regardless of the affective valence of the 
information.
Generally speaking, research has not supported 
Bower’s prediction of mood dependent recall (MDR). In 
his 1981 article in the American Psychologist, Bower
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reported some weak evidence supporting MDR which used a 
laboratory mood induction procedure involving hypnosis. 
Many studies investigating MDR have followed Bower in 
using the laboratory induction of mood, frequently with 
the Velten (1968) mood induction procedure. In this 
procedure, a particular mood (e.g. sadness) is 
apparently induced and the subject is given verbal 
stimuli to learn. A contrary mood state (e.g. happy) is 
then induced and new information is given to the subject 
to learn. Finally, the original mood state is restored 
and the subject is tested for recall.
A few studies have supported MDR since that time 
(Bartlett, Burleson & Santrock, 1982; Schare, Lisman & 
Spear, 1984; Mecklenbrauker & Hager, 1984), but numerous 
studies have found no MDR (Bower, Gilligan, & Montiero, 
1981; Bower & Mayer, 1985; Bower & Mayer, in press;
Brown & Taylor, 1985; Gilligan & Bower, 1984; Isen, 
Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978; Johnson & Klinger, 1988; 
Leight & Ellis, 1981; Schare, Lisman, & Spear, 1984; 
Wetzler, 1985;). In fact, in Bower’s research which 
originally reported MDR (Bower, Montiero, & Gilligan,
1978), the first two experiments found no MDR. Mood 
dependent recall (MDR) was found only in experiment 
three, which involved an interference methodology.
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These findings have led Bower (1987, p.453) to 
conclude that "mood-dependent retrieval using laboratory 
induced moods is an evanescent and unreliable 
phenomenon." Thus, Bower’s prediction regarding MDR has 
not been supported, and there may be other cognitive 
processes responsible for the few positive findings in 
this literature.
While the affective valence of the information is 
irrelevant with MDR, it is of great significance to mood 
congruent memory (MCM). A second prediction from 
Bower’s theory concerns this latter phenomena.
Activation of an emotion node, according to Bower, 
results also in the activation of semantically congruent 
memory units associated with this node. Thus, 
information that is consistent with the activated 
emotion node is elaborately processed and easily 
encoded, which results in better learning and recall.
Generally, it can be said that the phenomena of MCM 
in depression is fairly well established in the 
literature. Two basic research techniques have been 
used to investigate this hypothesis both with overall 
confirmatory conclusions. The first research paradigm 
involves the laboratory manipulation of mood. In these 
mood induction studies, several different induction 
procedures have been used, the most common being
Mood Congruent Memory 8 
Velten’s (1968) mood induction procedure. Typically, 
these experiments induce a particular mood state 
(usually either happy, sad, or control), the subjects 
are then presented with some verbal stimuli, and then 
recall of these stimuli is tested.
Many mood induction studies have been conducted 
which supported MCM (Bower, et al., 1981; Bower & Mayer,
1985; Bower et al., 1978; Brown & Taylor, 1985; Coleman, 
1975; Forgas, Bower, & Krantz, 1984; Mathews & Bradley, 
1983; Riskind, 1983; Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979; Teasdale 
& Russell, 1983; Teasdale & Spencer, 1984; Teasdale, 
Taylor, & Fogarty, 1980). Only one study using the 
induction methodology has produced supporting mood 
jLncrongruence (i.e. information recalled tended to be 
opposite or inconsistent with mood; Clark, Teasdale, 
Broadbent, & Martin, 1983), and three studies (Gotlib & 
McCann, 1984; study 2; Mecklenbrauker & Hager, 1984; 
Seigal, Johnson, & Sarason, 1979) found no significant 
MCM effect. In the Clark et al. (1983) study, an
unusually long period of time elapsed between the mood 
induction and the recall task, and it has been suggested 
(Blaney, 1986; Ingram, 1984) that in nondepressed 
subjects sadness may decay rapidly and that these 
subjects may even try to counteract the negative induced 
mood, hence showing a bias toward positive mood
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incongruent material with longer delays. Also, in two 
of the three studies where no significant MCM effect was 
reported (Gotlib & McCann, 1984; Seigal et al., 1979), 
the trend in these studies was consistent with MCM.
While the volume of mood induction studies 
supporting MCM seems convincing, there are several 
notable problems to this experimental paradigm. A 
number of problems arise out of demand characteristics 
of the mood induction methodology (Buchwald, Strack, & 
Coyne, 1981; Perrig' & Perrig, 1987; Polivy & Doyle,
1980). First, it is possible that subjects report that 
the mood induction procedure is effective even when not 
experiencing negative emotion. A second problem arises 
out of the potential for cognitive priming. In 
procedures such as the Velten technique where the 
subject makes increasingly depressing or positive self­
statements, this would seem to prime the subject to 
encode that information which is consistent with the 
experimenter’s previous instructions. Also, many of 
these induction procedures not only ask the subject to 
attempt to experience the desired mood, they also ask 
the subject to maintain this mood. Thus, in an attempt 
to maintain the "induced" emotion, the subject may 
attend to that information which is likely to continue 
this mood, hence resulting in the mood congruent
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effect. Finally, in the study of depression, it is hard 
to imagine that these induced moods are as extensive as 
those observed in the affective disorders of clinical 
proportions, or in the occurrence of negative emotions 
in the every day life of nondepressed individuals.
A second technique used in the investigation of MCM 
involves an individual-differences approach in which 
subjects are divided into groups according to their 
current depressive level. For example, a group of 
diagnosed depressed individuals may be compared with 
nondepressed subjects with regard to recall of 
information of varying hedonic valence. Once again, the 
literature is largely supportive of MCM using the 
individual differences methodology (e.g. Bradley & 
Mathews, 1983; Dobson & Shaw, 1987; Dunbar & Lishman, 
1984; Finkel, Glass, & Merluzzi, 1982; Ingram, Smith, & 
Brehm, 1983; Kuiper & Derry, 1982; McDowell, 1984).
This conclusion should be qualified with several 
observations. First, most of these studies found that 
instead of a bias toward remembering negative stimuli, 
depressives more often showed lower recall of positive 
stimuli. Thus, it may be that depressives show a lack 
of the positive bias that is typically found with 
nondepressed individuals, rather than a tendency for 
depressives to actually recall more depressive
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information than controls. Whatever the case, it still 
remains that depressives tend to recall proportionally 
more depressive material than do nondepressed subjects.
Secondly, it is not clear what the exact nature of 
the MCM bias is. Do depressed subjects tend to recall 
more depressive information than controls, or is their 
memory biased toward all negativistic subject matter? 
Conversely, do nondepressed subjects have a memory bias 
toward all nondepressed information (including neutral 
items ) , or is the bias only with positive material?
Thus, a study is needed which includes positive, 
neutral, depressive, and negativistic nondepressive 
verbal stimuli.
Finally, MCM is more easily observed when the 
information is encoded in a self-referent task than 
other encoding procedures. The self-referent encoding 
task (SRET) involves asking the subject to rate various 
adjectives as to whether or how well these words 
describe themselves (Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977). 
Variations of this methodology either ask the subjects 
to answer "yes" or "no" to whether the adjective applies 
to them, or to rate the extent to which the word applies 
to them on a Likert scale. Some studies (e.g. Clifford 
& Hemsley, 1987), have found that when a subject rates 
various adjectives in an task that asks them to apply
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the adjective to another individual, no MCM is evident. 
Thus, a significant problem with this methodology 
presents itself. The apparent MCM effect may not be due 
to mood per se, but rather to the bias that depressives 
say "yes" more often when unpleasant adjectives apply to 
them, and hence these stimuli are more easily recalled. 
Thus, more research is needed which uses other encoding 
tasks in investigating mood biases in memory.
The individual differences experimental methodology 
presents several additional problems. First, because 
exposure and recall occur in the same affective state, 
it is not known whether the MCM bias occurs at encoding, 
recall, or both. Second, there are many more symptoms 
of clinical depression in addition to sad affect. It 
may be argued that the MCM finding is due to other 
aspects of depression such as neuroticism. However, for 
the importance of investigating MCM process in 
depression, this individual differences approach seems 
to be the preferred procedure as it largely avoids the 
problems of demand characteristics and cognitive priming 
discussed earlier.
Perceptual and Attentional Processes
Evidence has been presented supporting the notion 
that depressives process self-related mood congruent
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information faster than controls. The SRET has been 
used to investigate mood congruent processing by 
recording the time elapsed between presentation of the 
query ("applies to you?"), and the subject’s response.
Not suprisingly, depressives endorse more mood congruent 
items in the SRET (MacDonald & Kuiper, 1984), and mood 
congruent adjectives are endorsed more readily than 
other stimuli (Bargh & Tota, 1988; Kuiper & MacDonald, 
1982; MacDonald & Kuiper, 1984; MacDonald & Kuiper,
1985 ) .
The findings on the perceptual effects of sadness 
are somewhat confusing. Bower (1987, p. 445) states 
that his theory predicts that
"A pleasant mood would prime and lower the threshold for 
pleasant words - or at least, increase the response bias 
in their favor - and unpleasant moods should facilitate 
the identification of unpleasant words."
This prediction is made because when an emotion node is 
activated, words and concepts associated with this node 
are easily perceived. Bower (1987) cites several 
unpublished failures to support this prediction, and 
other research (Clark, et al., 1983; MacLeod, Tata, & 
Mathews, 1987), has also failed to support this 
prediction. Several studies (Gotlib & Cane, 1987;
Gotlib & McCann, 1984; Powell & Hemsley, 1984; Small,
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1985) have found evidence of mood congruent perceptual 
bias or at least a mood congruent interference effect, 
however.
One may begin to sort out these apparently 
conflicting results by studying the different 
methodologies used in these investigations. Lexical 
decision tasks appear to evince no perceptual mood 
congruent bias (Clark, et al., 1983; MacLeod, et al.,
1987), while word recognition (Powell & Hemsley, 1984; 
Small, 1984) and Stroop interference tasks (Gotlib & 
McCann, 1984; Gotlib & Cane, 1987) do result in a 
significant mood congruent effect. Lexical decision 
tasks ask the subject to decide quickly whether a 
presented stimulus is an actual English word or not. 
Thus, words and nonwords are presented for which 
reaction times (RTs ) are recorded. The prediction from 
network theory is that RTs of mood congruent stimuli 
should be shorter than those of other verbal stimuli. 
This prediction however, has not been supported.
Word recognition studies present a word stimulus 
that is below the threshold of conscious recognition of 
the subject, and the subject is asked to identify these 
subthreshold stimuli. The interpretation of the word 
recognition studies is confounded however, because it is 
not known whether these studies are indeed testing a
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perceptual process, or merely a mood congruent response 
bias. For example, it is possible that a subject in 
this paradigm may glimpse a portion of the letters of
the presented word (e.g. "inf_r_or" of "inferior") and
guess correctly because of a mood congruent response 
bias. While the mood congruent response bias is of 
interest and is also predicted by Bower’s theory, it 
does not relate to the effect of mood on 
perceptual/attentional processes.
The only reliable finding related to the effects of
sad affect on mood appear to be from the Stroop
interference task (Gotlib & McCann, 1984; Gotlib & Cane, 
1987). In this methodology, a number of words are 
printed in several different colors. In this variation 
of the Stroop task, the words used are of varying 
affective valence. The task of the subject is to name 
the colors of the words as quickly as possible, and 
response latency is measured. These studies have found 
that color naming of words printed in various colors was 
slower for mood congruent stimuli (Gotlib & McCann,
1984; Gotlib & Cane, 1987). This finding is consistent 
with the predictions of Bower’s network theory.
Only a few studies have investigated mood congruent 
attentional processes in depression. One such study 
(MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986) used a new method for
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investigating attentional bias. In this procedure, a 
dot probe occasionally appeared following the 
presentation of a pair of verbal stimuli. These words 
differed in hedonic valence. This probe was located in 
the space vacated by one the two words, and the subject 
was asked to respond to this probe as quickly as 
possible. Reaction time (RT) measures were recorded, 
and these responses were compared with clinical group 
(depression, anxiety, and control) and affective valence 
(social threat, physical threat, and neutral) of the 
stimuli. The assumption from this design was that if a 
subject is allocating most of their attention to a 
particular type of stimuli (e.g. social threat), then 
reaction times to the dot probe should be faster when 
the probe follows this word type. This design has the 
advantage of requiring a neutral response from the 
subject (pressing a button), therefore, any observed 
effect cannot be attributed to a mood congruent response 
bias. In this paradigm, network theory would predict 
that reactions to probes appearing behind mood congruent 
stimuli would be speeded. While this prediction was 
supported with clinical anxiety subjects, no attentional 
bias was observed with depressed subjects. While this 
study used "threat" stimuli, and "threats to personal 
self-esteem" would seem to be mood congruent for
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depressives, it could be argued that the use of purely 
depressive stimuli may have produced an attention bias. 
Also, this study compared threat stimuli to neutral 
words. Given the apparent asymmetry of MCM cited above, 
it may be useful to look at positive stimuli as well.
It is possible that depressed subjects may not bias 
their attention toward depressive stimuli, but rather 
may direct their attention away from positive items.
Gotlib, McLachlan, and Katz (1988) conducted a 
study which addressed these issues, and found results 
similar to that of MacLeod et al. (1986). Mildly
depressed college students (scores greater than ten on 
the BDI) were compared with nondepressed counterparts 
(less than five on the BDI) on an attention allocation 
task similar to the MacLeod et al. (1986) design. This
study reported similar findings in that depressives did 
not allocate their attention toward any particular 
stimuli, while the controls actually allocated their 
attention to the "manic" or positive stimuli. Thus, it 
may be concluded that anxious individuals tend to bias 
their attention toward threat stimuli, nonanxious, 
nondepressed individuals tend to bias their attention 
away from threat words and toward positive stimuli, and 
depressed individuals appear to show no biased attention 
allocation regarding either threat or depressed words.
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Clinical Implications
Several theorists have argued that MCM may be an 
important maintenance variable in depression. John 
Teasdale (1983) has written perhaps the most precise 
version of this theory. He argues that a depressed mood 
makes negative memories (mood congruent) more accessible 
for memory retrieval than other information. More 
probable recall of these memories causes the depressed 
individual to remain sad which again makes predominantly 
negative memories more accessible for recall, resulting 
in a vicious cycle, depression and negativistic 
thinking. In addition, the tendency for a depressed 
individual to remember negative events leads to lowered 
expectations regarding adaptive coping behaviors and to 
increasingly negative interpretations of their 
experience, which tends to exacerbate the mood as well. 
For example, because of MCM, memories of social failures 
recur, leading to lowered social expectations for this 
individual, making less likely participation in social 
reinforcers, and may lead to negative interpretations of 
their social experiences. This situation is diagramed 
in Figure 1. If MCM is indeed a critical variable in 
the maintenance of depression, learning more about this 
phenomena could lead to improved treatment methods, and 
perhaps help prevent relapse.
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Figure 1
Hypothesized relationship between depression, MCM, 
and avoidance of adaptive behaviors
LOWERED EXPECTATIONS RE: OUTCOME
OF COPING BEHAVIORS
INCREASED RECALL OF 
NEGATIVE EVENTS
AVOIDANCE OF 
EFFECTIVE COPING 
BEHAVIORS (e.g. 
social reinforcers)
DEPRESSION
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The Process of Mood Congruent Memory
Earlier it was shown that in the case of 
sadness/depression, MCM as investigated by free recall 
methodologies, is a reliable and robust finding.
However, very little is known about the variables which 
determine this phenomena. While Bower’s associative 
network approach and self-schema theory have been used 
as an explanation, empirical data relating to the 
underlying process of the MCM effect are currently 
lacking. It is apparent that many processes operate in 
free recall, and therefore other procedures may be 
needed to investigate what is responsible for MCM. Mood
congruent memory may be explained by several processes. 
It is possible that MCM is due to perceptual or 
attentional biases on the part of the depressed 
individual. Secondly, encoding processes may be 
involved in MCM. Retrieval strategies may also account 
for depressed individuals recalling more negative 
material. Of course, it is also possible that 
combinations of these processes contribute to MCM. In
the following paragraphs, each of these possibilities 
will be explored.
It is possible that the depressed patient biases 
his or her attention toward mood congruent stimuli. It 
may be that the depressed person allocates attention to
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mood congruent stimuli, therefore rendering them likely 
to be encoded in memory. However, as discussed above, 
it does not appear that depressives evince an 
attentional bias. In addition, MacLeod et al. (1986)
could find no relationship between RT to the various 
word stimuli (including socially threatening words), and 
later recognition performance with these same stimuli. 
Therefore, evidence to date does not appear to support 
attentional bias as an exmplantion for MCM.
A second, perhaps more likely, possibility 
involving attentional bias in depression is that mood 
congruent stimuli distract the depressive from learning 
other mood incongruent information. This suggestion is 
consistent with the findings reviewed above that 
depressives named the colors of mood congruent words 
slower in a Stroop task. It is possible that these mood 
congruent stimuli distract the depressive, thus 
rendering the encoding of other information less likely.
Cognitive processes related to encoding processes 
may also relate to MCM. Mandler (1980) has suggested 
that encoding may involve two processes, integration and 
subsequent elaboration. This suggestion has arisen out 
of research findings with amnesic patients. Various 
researchers have found that the behavior of amnesics may 
be influenced by performing a previous task, even if
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they cannot remember that they performed the task, let 
alone the details of the event. This phenomenon has 
been observed with several different tasks, for example, 
writing the mirror image of a word. A typical 
experiment of this sort may involve having amnesics 
practice writing the mirror image of various words. In 
subsequent mirror writing tasks, these subjects will 
write words faster if they are words to which they have 
been exposed previously in this task. Amnesics show 
this advantage, even though they report that they cannot 
remember practicing writing these mirror images earlier 
(cf. Squire, 1987).
Parallel results have also been demonstrated with 
normals (cf. Jaccoby & Witherspoon, 1982). The ability 
for a task involving the study of some stimuli to affect 
subsequent behavior, even though the subject may not 
explicitly recall the task, has been called implicit 
memory. Memory that is directly accessible to conscious 
recollection has been called explicit memory.
Henceforth in this paper I will refer to these two forms 
of memory in this manner. They have also been labelled 
procedural and declarative memory (Cohen, 1984; Squire, 
1983), reference and working memory (Olton, 1983), 
expectancy and data based memory systems (Kesner, 1980), 
and this distinction has also been related to Tulving’s
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(1972) division between semantic and episodic memory. 
Generally speaking, these theories differ as to how 
independent the theorists view these two memory systems 
(cf. Jacoby & Witherspoon, 1982).
This effect of memory without awareness led Mandler 
(1980) to propose two distinct encoding processes, 
integration and elaboration. Integration is assumed to 
be an automatic process, which involves the activation 
of a schema or memory structure. This process is 
assumed to be modality specific (e.g. auditory or 
visual), and tied to the physical features of the 
perceived information. Because of the schema’s internal 
organization, mutual activation occurs among the 
schema’s components. This activation produces further 
strengthening (or integration) of the internal 
organization of the schema. Thus, according to Mandler, 
integration relates to the actual structure of the 
memory representation. Activation, and subsequent 
integration make a schema "more accessible in the sense 
that it will come to mind more readily when only some of 
its features or components are presented" (Graf &
Mandler, 1984, p. 554). Thus, a well integrated schema 
will be more likely to be activated if some of its 
components are presented to a subject. For example, if 
"loser" is a well integrated word schema for a subject,
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the presentation of "lo" will likely activate the entire 
word, "loser".
While integration is assumed to be an automatic 
process, elaboration is presumed by Mandler to occur 
subsequent to integration and is subject to control 
processes. In cognitive psychology, control processes 
involve what information the subject decides to process, 
and how the subject decides to process this 
information. Generally, cognitive elaboration is seen 
as the extent and degree of cognitive analysis that 
information receives (Craik & Tulving, 1975). According 
to Mandler, elaboration, which involves relating the 
occurrence of a word schema to its context, provides 
associations to related words and concepts. Elaboration 
is not modality specific or tied to the physical 
features of the stimulus as is integration. While 
activation and integration increase only the 
accessibility of a schema, elaborative processing 
increases both accessibility and retrievabi1ity. Hence 
the relation of integration to implicit memory, and 
elaboration to explicit memory.
Free recall data tell us little about the internal 
structure of the emotional information. It is possible 
that mood congruent information in depression is 
structured like other memory representations but is much
Mood Congruent Memory 2 
more elaborated. According to Mandler’s framework, the 
MCM bias with free recall in depression provides us with 
no information regarding the integration or internal 
strength of mood congruent memory representations.
Thus, a test of implicit memory bias in depression would 
provide valuable information as to the internal 
structure of depressed congruent memory representations.
As stated above, Mandler has suggested that 
integration is an automatic process, whereas elaboration 
is affected by control processes. Theories explaining 
MCM such as Bower’s (1981), strongly imply automatic 
processes. However, it is possible that strategic 
elaborative processes may be involved in MCM. It is 
possible that depressives may use some controlled 
strategy in encoding stimuli that leads to a recall 
advantage for mood congruent information. It has been 
found that free recall (as well as cued recall and word 
recognition) are enhanced in semantic encoding 
conditions, whereas semantic versus nonsemantic encoding 
conditions has no differential effect with implicit 
memory (Graf & Mandler, 1984; Mandler, Graf, & Kraft, 
1986). In addition to depth of processing, retention 
interval, and modality of study-presentation also show a 
different pattern of results in explicit versus implicit 
memory (Graf & Schacter, 1987; Greene, 1986). These
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findings lend credence to Mandler’s proposal that 
activation and integration are relatively automatic, 
while explicit memory is subject to strategic 
elaborative processes. Thus, it is possible that MCM is 
due primarily to strategic elaborative processes and has 
little to do with the internal structure of the 
emotional memories.
Evidence exists to indirectly support this 
suggestion. As noted above, if the subject is 
encouraged to relate the stimuli to him or herself, the 
MCM effect was more likely to be found. If MCM is . 
operative in maintaining clinical depression and self­
related encoding is required, then it must be posited 
that depressives tend to excessively relate stimuli to 
themselves. This process is similar to Beck’s suggested 
cognitive distortion of personalization (Beck, et al. , 
1979), and internal attributions suggested by Seiigman’s 
reformulated learned helplessness theory of depression 
(Seligman, (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978). In 
Lewinsohn’s recent integrative theory of depression, 
self-focused attention is also afforded an important 
role (Lewinsohn, Hoberman, Teri, & Hautzinger, 1985). 
Limited research (Ingram, Lumry, Cruet, & Sieber, 1987), 
has supported the notion that depressives are more given 
to self-focused attention. Thus, it may be that both
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depressed individuals and subjects who have been induced 
to feel sad are likely to encode items in a self­
referent manner. This proposal implies that depressives 
often elaborate mood congruent information, but does not 
necessarily imply any differences in the integration 
process itself.
If Bower’s proposals are correct, then one would 
expect that the individual in whom mood has activated 
congruent memory structures, many associations would be 
produced with mood congruent stimuli. If the depressed 
individual does yjroduce these mood congruent 
associations due to spreading activation, then these 
associations should benefit not only encoding but recall 
as well. Thus, it is possible that the MCM effect is 
due primarily to a retrieval bias and may have 1ittle to 
do with encoding.
Ingram (1988) has argued that studies which use 
incidental recall paradigms (such as the SRET ) test 
automatic processes in memory. He argues that MCM found 
in incidental recall studies indicates an automatic 
encoding process because the subject is not told at 
encoding that they will later be asked to recall the 
information. However, Ingram ignores the possibility of 
retrieval biases that may be unrelated to encoding 
biases. In fact, evidence presented by Anderson and
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Pichert (1978), indicates that retrieval processes may 
be independent from encoding processes. In this study, 
subjects were asked to read a story that involved the 
description of a home from either the perspective of a 
home buyer, or a burglar. After asking the subjects to 
recall the story once, they were asked to recall the 
story a second time from the perspective other than the 
one in which they had read it originally (home buyer or 
burgler). Results showed that upon second recall, 
subjects reported information not previously recalled, 
and this was information important to the second 
perspective. In addition, they also recalled less 
information that was important to their original 
perspective.
This finding suggests that it may be inappropriate 
to conclude that results from incidental recall 
paradigms are reflective of automatic processes.
Evidence suggests that implicit memory is not affected 
by a shift of perspectives at recall as explicit memory 
appears to be. Thus, a comparison of implicit and 
explicit memory bias in depression would also lend 
information important to the issue of retrieval 
strategies in depression.
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Some have suggested that MCM is due to mood 
congruent stimuli being unusually frequent stimuli for 
depressives. For example, words like "depressed",
"sad", and "loser”, are stimuli both heard and used 
frequently by these subjects. However, if MCM were due 
to individual differences in word frequencies, one would 
not expect to find MCM in normals with induced 
sadness. As reviewed earlier, MCM has been established 
with nondepressed individuals who have been induced to 
feel sad. Also, if individual differences due to word 
frequency accounted for MCM, one would not expect to 
find MCM with diurnal variations of mood, and one would 
expect to find MCM in remitted depressives. Clark and 
Teasdale (1982) found that depressives tended to recall 
more unpleasant memories when they were more depressed, 
and Dobson and Shaw (1987) found that the pattern of MCM 
memory changed upon remission of depression. Thus, the 
available evidence does not support a word frequency 
hypothesis for MCM.
Problem
As argued above, data regarding the mechanisms 
which account for MCM in depression is lacking. The 
purpose of this study was to investigate implicit versus 
explicit memory bias in depression, and in this way
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investigate both the structure of emotional information 
in depression (via integration), and the role of control 
processes in MCM such as encoding or retrieval 
strategies. This study provides needed information as 
to the processes Involved in MCM associated with 
depression.
This study compared two groups of individuals, a 
group of depressed individuals, and a non-depressed 
control group. All subjects were exposed to a set of 
words of varying affective valence (positive, neutral, 
depressed, and physical threat). As suggested earlier, 
inclusion of positive, neutral, depressed, and negative- 
nondepressed verbal stimuli would aid in determining the 
exact nature of MCM in depression. Physical threat 
subject, material (e.g. ambulance, coronary, stab, pain), 
was considered to be negative-nondepressed information. 
Subjects engaged in a modified SRET with these stimuli 
that followed the design of Mathews, Mogg, May, and 
Eysenck (1989). In this SRET variation, all subjects 
were instructed to imagine themselves in a scene which 
involved each word. Following this encoding task, 
subjects participated in a choice RT task. This purpose 
of this task was to separate the experimental tasks of 
interest. Then all subjects engaged in either a cued 
recall (CR) task, designed to test explicit memory, or a
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word completion task. The order of CR or word 
completion was counterbalanced. In the word completion 
task the subject was asked to complete a three letter 
word stem with the first word that came to mind. This 
procedure has been used as a test of implicit memory 
(e.g. Greene, 1986; Graf & Mandler, 1984; Mandler Graf,
& Kraft, 1986). This is a test of implicit memory 
because there are no explicit instructions to recall 
study items, but subjects typically complete the letter 
stems more frequently with studied items than with non­
studied (unprimed) words. Thus, in Mandler’s (1980) 
conceptualization, words that are completed in this task 
are the most accessible, and hence better integrated, at 
the time of testing. Half of the letter stems in this 
task were from words to which they had been exposed in 
the SRET (primed condition), and half were the first 
letters from words to which they were not exposed 
(unprimed condition). The unprimed condition was 
included to control for response bias.
Following another' filler task, all subjects engaged 
in the alternate memory task, either word completion or 
cued recall. Thus, the design of this study was a 2 
(subject groups) x 4 (affective valence of verbal 
stimuli) x 3 (type of memory test) mixed design. This
Mood Congruent Memory 32 
experimental design is illustrated in Figure 2 (p. 38).
The predictions of this study are listed below.
Hypothesis 1: It is predicted that depressives will 
recall proportionally more negative words than a control 
group in the cued recall task. This finding is 
predicted because of previous findings of explicit 
memory bias in depression. Because explicit memory 
involves both integration and elaboration, the results 
of the explicit task alone cannot determine the extent 
of involvement of these two processes in MCM.
Hypothesis 2: It is predicted that depressives
will complete proportionally more mood congruent word 
stems from a list to which they had been previously 
exposed in an encoding task than will control subjects. 
However, it is predicted that depressed individuals will 
not differ from controls in their completion of mood 
congruent letter stems from a list, of words to which 
they had not been exposed. This finding would indicate 
that the structure of mood congruent memory 
representations is more organized and more easily 
activated than non-mood congruent schemata. Also, this 
finding would rule out a retrieval strategy or bias as 
the sole variable accounting for MCM.
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Because the there were two different types of 
memory involved, separate ANOVAs were calculated for 
explicit and implicit memory. For explicit memory, an 
interaction between group and valence is predicted. For 
implicit memory a three way interaction between group, 
test, and affective valence is predicted. A thi'ee way 
interaction would indicate that the memory tasks had a 
differential effect with group and affective valence of 
the verbal stimuli. If, it is found that the depressed 
group remember more negative words in the cued recall 
(explicit) condition, but not in the word completion 
(implicit) condition, this pattern of data would imply 
that the mood congruent stimuli are the better 
elaborated, but not necessarily better integrated than 
are other words. Thus, this finding would suggest 
elaboration as the important mechanism in MCM. If 
however, it is found that depressives recall 
proportionally more negative words in the word 
completion but not in the cued recall condition, this 
pattern of data would indicate that mood congruent 
stimuli are better integrated but not necessarily better 
elaborated for depressives. This result would suggest 
that the structure of the mood congruent information may 
be primarily responsible for the MCM effect. Although 
this is the result found in the Mathews et al. (1989)
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study with anxiety subjects, this would be an unlikely 
finding. Because explicit memory is a reflection of 
both integration and elaboration, integration should 
enhance explicit and implicit memory. Thus, one would 
not expect to find an enhancement of implicit memory 
without an enhancement of explicit memory as well. If 
an implicit memory bias is found with depressed subjects 
but not with controls, then an additional cognitive 
mechanism must be posited (e.g. cognitive avoidance), to 
account for the lack of an explicit, memory bias.
Hypothesis 3: Finally, it is predicted that the
depressives will respond proportionally faster to mood 
congruent stimuli in the encoding task. According to 
Bower, mood congruent concepts (in this case depressive 
related events and concepts) have subthreshold 
activation, and thus imagining scenes related to these 
congruent stimuli should be proportionally faster. It 
should be noted, that this hypothesis is not crucial to 
the basic purpose of this study.
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METHOD
Subjects
Two experimental groups were used in this study.
The experimental group consisted of individuals with a 
primary diagnosis of unipolar depression, i.e. subjects 
as major depression or dysthymia. This group was 
composed of 17 subjects. The diagnosis of depression 
was confirmed through clinical interview (Schedule for 
Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia; SADS ) , and 
administration of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). 
Individuals in this group met the criteria of a BDI 
score above 19. Also, these individuals met the 
diagnostic criteria for either dysthymia or major 
depression as defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders, the third revised version 
(DSM-III-R; American Psychiatric Association, 1987).
All diagnoses were confirmed by a licensed 
psychologist. In addition, if subjects were not 
interested in treatment, they were excluded from the 
study. Four subjects who met the diagnostic criteria 
for unipolar depression were not interested in treatment 
and therefore excluded.
The comparison group was recruited from the campus 
at Louisiana State University. This group also 
consisted of 17 individuals. No subjects in this group
36
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were experiencing any axis I DSM-III-R psychiatric 
disorder. Thus, the clinical interview served to 
exclude any other psychiatric diagnoses. Also, any 
individual with a BDI score greater than seven was 
excluded from this group. Finally, this group was 
formally matched to the experimental group for gender, 
age ( + three years), and verbal intelligence (+ .5 s.d. 
via the Shipley Institutes of Living scale).
The two groups were compared by analyzing verbal 
intelligence and age separately with ANOVA to delineate 
any group differences. As seen in Table 2, no 
differences were found between the two groups in verbal 
I.Q., F( 1 , 32) = 1 . 79, p=.19, or age, F(1,32)=0.00, p=.97. 
Of course, significant group differences were found in 
the BDI, F(1,32)=148.47, p<.0001, and other state and 
trait measures used in this study (see Table 2 for a 
listing of means and significant differences).
Materials and apparatus
Clinical Measures
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, 1978) . This 
instrument has extensive normative data and therefore is 
a valuable instrument to assist in diagnosing depressive 
disorders. Psychometric data on this instrument are 
good. Item-total correlations range from .31 to .68,
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and Spearman-Brown corrected split-half reliability has 
been reported at .93 (Beck, 1972). Test-retest 
reliability for nonclinical populations is also 
satisfactory (.75; Miller & Seligman, 1973), and as 
expected are somewhat lower for patient populations (.49 
after three weeks; May, Urquhart, & Tarran, 1969). 
Correlations with other depression scales are generally 
good, and the BDI has been found to be sensitive to 
clinical change as well. This instrument is found in 
Appendix A.
Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophreni a
(SAPS; (Endicott. & Spitzer, 1978). This interview scale 
was based on the Research Diagnostic Criteria (RDC; 
Spitzer, Endicott, & Robins, 1975; 1978), which is quite 
similar to the criteria presented in DSM-III. This 
scale is valuable in that it covers the symptom content 
of depression comprehensively, and has been used 
extensively in depression research studies.
Psychometric data are available on eight summary scales 
derived from the SADS (Endicott and Spitzer, 1978).
These subscales have been titled: 1) depressive mood and
ideation; 2) endogenous features; 3) depressive- 
associated features; 4) suicidal ideation and behavior; 
5) anxiety; 6) manic syndrome; 7) delusions- 
hallucinations: and 8) formal thought disorder.
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Cronbach alphas for the eight subscales range from .47- 
.97. With the exclusion of the formal thought disorder 
scale and the anxiety scale all alphas were above .79. 
Thus, internal consistency is adequate for the scales 
important for diagnosis of depression. Inter-rater 
reliabilities had interclass correlations of .82 to 
.99. Test-retest reliabilities at one week ranged from 
.49 to .93. Once again, all scales but the formal 
thought disorder and the anxiety scales had test-retest 
reliabilities above .78. One may refer to this 
instrument in Appendix B.
Visual Analogue Scale (VAS; Aitken, 1969) . This 
scale is a relatively brief scale, yet has psychometric 
properties comparable to longer scales (e.g. Davies, 
Burrows, & Pyton, 1975; Zeally & Aitken, 1969). It 
consists of a 100 mm. line with "normal mood" at one 
pole and "extreme depression" at the opposite end of the 
line. The subject simply marks where he or she is 
feeling at the moment on this line. An example of this 
measure is found in Appendix C.
Profile of Mood States (POMS; McNair, Lorr, &
Droppleman, 1971). This measure provided additional 
mood state information. It consists of 65 adjectives 
which are rated on a 5-point likert type scale. Factor 
analysis of responses to these adjectives has yielded
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six scales: 1) tension-anxiety, 2) depression-dejection,
3) anger-hostility, 4) vigor, 5) fatigue, and 6) 
confusion. The two scales of interest in this study are 
the tension-anxiety (T) and the depression-dejection (D) 
subscales. This measure has also been found to have 
adequate psychometric properties. Internal consistency 
scores (via the Kuder-Richardson-20) are above .90 for 
both the anxiety and the depression subscales (.92 and 
.95 respectively). Test-retest reliability ranges from 
.70 (T) and .74 (D) for 20 days, to .51 (T) and .47 (D) 
for six weeks. The POMS has been shown to be sensitive 
to clinical change (e.g. Lorr, McNair, Weinstein, 
Michaux, & Raskin, 1961). Also, this measure has been 
shown to change in various mood induction studies (e.g. 
Pillard & Fisher, 1967). Further, the various subscales 
of the POMS have been shown to correlate with other 
related measures. This scale is shown in Appendix D.
Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ; Eysenck & 
Eysenck, 1963). This measure served as the trait
measure in this study. The factor of Neuroticism is a 
trait related to anxiety and depression. Although this 
measure contains three clinical scales, only the 
neuroticism scale (N) was used in this study. Internal 
consistency of the subscaies of the EPQ is adequate, 
ranging from .74-.85 (N=.84). At an interval of one
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month, test-retest reliabilities range from .51 to .90, 
with most groups scoring in the .80 to .90 range.
Further, the authors of this test have shown that N is 
related to variables that are similar to the construct 
of neuroticism. The reader may refer to this inventory 
in Appendix E.
Shipley Institutes of Living Scale (Pollack, 1942) 
This scale has been used extensively for screening 
verbal intelligence and has been found to be an adequate 
measure for this purpose (Prado & Taub, 1966). Validity 
data for this measure are also presented in Pollack 
(1942). It is a pencil and paper instrument which 
yields a vocabulary score and an abstraction score. The 
vocabulary score was used as a measure of verbal 
intelligence. A copy of this instrument is presented in 
Appendix F.
Verbal Stimuli
These stimuli were gathered from various sources in 
the literature (e.g. Derry & Kuiper, 1982; Gotlib,
McCann, & Katz, 1988; Mathews et al., 1989) and were 
intended to represent depressive/sad congruent, physical 
threat, neutral, and positive affective valences. These 
stimuli were then normed with 50 undergraduate students 
at Louisiana State University. These students made
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qualitative judgments on each word as to whether they 
were depressed, neutral, or positive. Depressed words 
were defined as words the subjects associated with 
unpleasantness, and they were instructed that words 
which involved threats to self-esteem or emotional well 
being should be rated as depressed as well. Positive 
stimuli were defined as being words of a pleasant 
nature, and neutral words were words that were neither 
pleasant or unpleasant. Subjects were instructed that 
if a word had mixed qualities for them (i.e. both 
pleasant and unpleasant features), that they should rat 
these words in a "not sure" category, thus preventing 
the inclusion of neutral words with mixed affective 
valence. Only those words with 70% agreement of rated 
category were used in this experiment. Physical threat 
stimuli were derived from past research (Mathews et al. 
1989). Words from each affective valence category were 
balanced according to length and frequency using the 
norms provided by Kucera and Francis (1967). ANOVA 
analyses indicated these words did not differ according 
to length or frequency (see Table 1). See Appendix G 
for the for the final list of stimuli.
All of the words had a unique three or four letter 
word stem. In addition, none of the three letter stems 
were common to the first three letters of any four
Mood Congruent Memory
letter stems. For example, asse  and ass  could not
both be included. For each of these words, there was at 
least one word (not presented to the subjects), which 
shared their three or four letter word stem yet was 
higher in word frequency. Also, there was at least one 
word of greater frequency for every form of the stimulus 
list words with essentially the same meaning (e.g. for 
the stimulus "fail", it was determined that there was at. 
least one word beginning with the letters "fai" of 
greater use frequency than "failure" as well as "fail").
These words were then divided into three sets (A,
B, or C ) consisting of an equal number of words from 
each affective valence category. Each subject was 
exposed to two of the three sets. This was done in 
order that for each subject one set could serve as the 
explicit recall set, one set as the implicit memory set, 
and one set as an unprimed set. The stimuli in each of 
these three sets were also balanced according to length 
and frequency as above. Appendix H lists the stimuli in 
their respective sets (A, B, or C ). Once again, ANOVA 
analyses indicated that these sets did not differ 
according to length or frequency (see Table 1).
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Table 1
F tables and means for frequency and length data for 
word stimuli.
Frequency: Length:
Source ! F ! p ! : f ; P i
Affective valence,1 .07 ! .98 | ! .51 | .68 !
Set ! .17 | .85 ! .06 ! .94 |
Set x Valence .63 | .71 i ! .11 I .99 !
Frequency Means: Length Means:
Variable ! Mean ! ! Mean !
Positive ! 21.08 | 6.92 !
Neutral | 23.86 ! | 6.38 |
Depressed ! 21.46 ! ! 6.92 i
Physical Threat ! 19.50 ! ! 6.83 :
Set A ! 24.03 [ ! 6.84 j
Set B ! 21.31 | | 6.75 |
Set C ! 19.09 ! ! 6.69 !
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Response sheets
Response sheets were created for each memory task.
The cued recall task consisted of 32 three and four 
letter word stems from one of the three sets of stimuli 
(A, B, or C ) to which they were exposed in the encoding 
task. The word completion response sheet consisted of 
64 three and four letter word stems that related to two 
of the three sets of verbal stimuli (AB, BC, or AC), one 
of those sets being the one to which the subjects were 
not exposed to during the encoding task. The order of 
the words for both tests was pseudo-randomized, in that 
there were no more than two word stems of the same 
affective valence presented in order.
Apparatus
The Micro Experimental Laboratory (MEL; Schneider, 
1988; Butler, 1988), was used to present the verbal 
stimuli and the presentation of the filler tasks. This 
software program was used in conjunction with an IBM PC 
or compatible. This software system has received good 
reviews (e.g. Butler , 1988), and has accurate timing 
for RT experiments.
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Procedure
Preceding the experiments, all subjects were 
interviewed using the SADS and were administered the 
BDI. From these instruments a determination was made as 
to the appropriateness of the subject for the 
experimental or comparison groups. All interview data 
were reviewed with a licensed psychologist. If the 
subject was deemed appropriate, he or she was scheduled 
for the participation in the actual experiments.
Encoding Task
Each subject was presented with verbal stimuli from 
two of the three sets of words as described above (AB,
BC, or AC). Subjects were informed that this was an 
imagination task and that they will be presented with a 
number of words on the video monitor. Each word was 
presented for ten seconds duration, and the subjects 
were asked to imagine themselves in a scene that 
involved themselves and the word. Subjects were 
informed that they could think of a pa.L scene, a future 
scene, or an imaginary scene. Subjects were asked to 
press a button when the;, thought of a scene that 
involved thc,.iselves and the presented word. After this 
response, an instruction appeared on the monitor with
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the word encouraging the subject to continue to think 
about this scene. After the presentation of each word, 
each subject was asked to rate how pleasant or 
unpleasant the scene was, where 0=very unpleasant, and 
9=very pleasant.
Seven practice words were presented, followed by 
the 64 experimental words. The first example word 
"journey" was presented and the experimenter gave 
examples of how the subjects might imagine themselves 
involved with this word. For example, subjects may be 
encouraged to imagine themselves on a trip to Florida, 
or a backpack in the Rocky Mountains etc. Following 
this example word, six more trial stimuli were presented 
so that the subjects were comfortable with this encoding 
task.
Filler Task
Following the encoding task each subject was 
involved in a filler task lasting approximately three 
minutes. In this task, subjects responded to various 
number or letter (nonword) groups and determined whether 
these groups were numbers or letters as quickly as 
possible. Filler tasks were used in this experiment to 
temporally and phenomenologically separate the 
experimental tasks of interest (i.e. the encoding task 
and the two memory tasks).
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Memory Tasks
The two memory tasks were counter balanced for 
order. Thus, following the first filler task, half of 
the subjects engaged in the cued recall test, and half 
engaged in the word completion task. After they 
completed one memory task, they participated in a 
similar choice reaction time filler task as before, and 
then were administered the alternate memory task.
Cued Recall Test: Subjects were presented with a 
list of three or four-letter stems (see Appendix H).
They were asked to attempt to remember words from the 
imagination task that began with these letters.
Subjects were encouraged to guess if they were not sure 
of a response. The amount of time a subject took to 
fill this sheet out was recorded, but no subject was 
given longer than five minutes to complete this memory 
test.
Word Completion Test: In the word completion test,
subjects were given a response sheet similar to the one 
used for cued recall, and were asked to write down the 
first word that came into their mind that began with the 
three letters printed on the sheet. Subjects were 
encouraged to complete this task as quickly as 
possible. This response sheet contained three and four 
letter word stems from the primed condition (words to
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which they had been exposed in the encoding task), and 
the unprimed condition (the group of words to which they 
had NOT been exposed). Once again, subjects were timed 
as to how long they took to complete this task.
Following the memory tests, all subjects were 
administered a debriefing interview which is included in 
appendix
Scoring of Cued Recall and Word Completion
In most cases, the shortest form of the word was 
used for the verbal stimuli. Words subjects produce in 
the memory tasks which were of a different form than the 
stimulus originally presented but were of essentially 
the same meaning (e.g. "failure" for the original 
presentation of "fail"), were scored as correct 
responses. A list of the acceptable responses is found 
in Appendix I.
Statistics
Combining explicit and implicit memory tests in one 
ANOVA is probably inappropriate because one is not 
comparing similar measures. Thus, the explicit memory 
test and the implicit memory test were analyzed 
separately. In this case, a two-way interaction between 
group and valance was predicted for explicit memory, and 
a three way interaction between group, valance, and test
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(primed and unprimed) was predicted for implicit 
memory. If ANOVA re.su J ted in significant main or 
interaction effects, linen planned orthogonal comparisons 
were performed as described by Kirk (1982, p. 92-98).
Hypothesis three was analysed with a 2 (group) by <1 
(a/‘feefive valence) ANOVA for RT. A significant: 
interaction was predict, ed . II' an inter-action was found, 
p]armed orlhogonaI comparisons were performed as 
liesc; r i bed abovo .
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Figure 3
Predicted results for cued recall and for word 
completion tasks.
higher # 
words recalled
# correct words 
recalled
lower # words 
recalled
o
Negative Nondepressed
Affective Valence
Group:
Depressed:
Comparison: o o
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Figure 4
Prediction for word completion of unprimed stimuli.
higher # 
words recalled
# correct words 
recalled
lower # words 
recalled
Negative Nondepressed
Affective Valence
Group:
Depressed: ••
Comparison: o o
RESULTS
Group Differences:
The two groups were compared on the BDI, VAS, EPQ- 
N, and the Depression, Vigor, and Fatigue factors of the 
POMS using ANOVA. The purpose of these analyses was to 
delineate group differences that may be important to the 
interpretation of the memory recall data which were the 
primary focus of the study. As reported in the methods 
section, no group differences were found for age and 
verbal I.Q., thus matching on these variables was 
successful. Significant group differences were found 
with other variables that one might expect to 
differentiate depressed and nondepressed individuals. 
Table 2 summarizes the results of these analyses and 
group means for each variable. As expected, the 
depressed group scored significantly higher than
controls on the BDI, VAS, EPQ-R, and the Depression and
Fatigue subscales of the POMS. Comparison subjects had 
significantly higher scores than depressives on the 
Vigor factor of the POMS.
ANOVA for Order Effects.
As noted in the Methods section, memory tests 
(implicit and explicit) were counterbalanced for order. 
However, it may be argued that the findings may be an
53
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Table 2
Means of Various Variables by Group
Group
Variable F p ! Depressed Comparison !
Age 0.00 .97 26.94 26.82
Verbal I.Q . 1 . 79 .19 ! 16 . 44 16.69 !
BDI * 148 . 5 .0001; 27.53 3.71 !
VAS* 20 . 08 .0001! 46 . 24 11.53 !
EPQ
Neuroticism* 39.36! .0001! 18.35 9 . 06 !
POMS
Depression* 102.9! .0001! 32 . 53 4.88 !
Vi gor* 17.36! .0002! 10. 35 18.65 !
Fatigue* 26.06! .0001! 16.88 6.18 !
Note: * indicates that the two groups differed 
significantly on this variable (p<.05). For all above 
analyses df=l,32.
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artifact of order of memory tests. Therefore, ANOVAs 
were calculated to determine the extent of the effect o 
order, if any. No main effect was found for order, 
F(l,30)=.94, p=.34. Also, no significant interaction 
effects involving order were found. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that the primary findings of the study were an 
artifact of the order of presentation of memory tests.
Hypothesis 1: Mood Congruent Memory in Explicit memory.
As argued earlier, it is probably inappropriate to 
combine two different measures of memory in one ANOVA. 
Therefore, explicit and implicit memory conditions were 
analyzed separately. A test of sphericity was 
calculated to determine if the probability of the 
ordinary F test was correct. This statistic tests the 
hypothesis that the orthogonal components are 
uncorrelated and have equal variance. If this 
hypothesis is not rejected, then the probabilities 
provided by the ordinary F tests are appropriate (cf. 
Freund, Littell, & Spector, 1986, p. 183). The test of 
sphericity indicated that ordinary F tests were 
appropriate for analysis of explicit memory data 
(Chisquare approximation (5)=8.64, p=.12). As 
predicted, a significant valence by group interaction 
was found in the explicit (CR) memory condition,
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F (3,90 ) =3.92, p<.01. Table 3 summarizes means and group 
differences pertaining to this analysis. (See Figures 
5, 6 and 7 for a graphic presentation of these results. 
Figure 5 illustrates the interaction between group and 
valence for recall of only the positive and depressed 
words only. Figure 6 illustrates the results including 
recall of words of all four affective valences.
Orthogonal contrasts showed that the comparison 
group recalled more positive words than the depressed 
group. Thus, the expected MCM bias was found in the 
explicit memory condition. However, a group difference 
was also found in explicit recall of physical threat 
words. Here the comparison group recalled more physical 
threat words than did the depressed group.
Planned orthogonal contrasts indicated that within 
the depressed group, subjects recalled significantly 
more depressed words than either positive words or 
physical threat words (see Table 3). In the comparison 
group, subjects recalled more positive words than 
depressed words.
Because previous research has shown that 
depressives generally recall less information than 
normal controls, it could be argued that direct
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Table 3
Means of Various Recall Measures by Group and Test
Valence
| [Positive 
Group! Test I
Neutral Depressed !Physical 
! Threat
D
a
! 2 . 94
rv> 1
ab
3 .18
be
3. 94
a
3 . 00
C
0 1C |
c
! 4.47
be
3 . 88
ab
3 . 29
be
4 . 06
D ! 1.59 1 .88 2.47 1 .82
C
i r i meq. i
! 2.11 2. 00 1 . 94 1 . 71
D I 0.88 0. 94 1 .41 0 . 65
C
unprimea
I 1 .06 0. 94 1.35 0.47
Note: D=depressed group, C=comparison group, CR=cued 
recall test. Explicit test is represented by test of 
cued recall (CR) , Implicit test is represented by primed 
and unprimed word completion. In CR condition, means 
that share a letter are not significantly different.
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Figure 5
Interaction between Group and Valence for Positive and
Depressed Words.
5.0
4.0
3.0
HITS
2.0
1.0
0.0
D
D
Explicit
Memory
Primed
Implicit
Memory
Unprimed 
(baseline)
Positive Depressed
Valence
Note: "Hits" is the number of correct completions
on any given test. The solid lines connected by ’D ’ 
represents the results for the depressed group. The 
dotted line connected by ’C ’ represents the comparison 
group.
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Figure 6
Interaction between group and valence for words of all
Note: "Hits" is the number of correct completions
on any given test. The solid lines connected by ’D ’ 
represents the results for the depressed group. The 
dotted line connected by *C’ represents the comparison 
group.
affective valences
5 . 0
4.0
3 . 0
Explicit 
Memory
HITS
2.0
D, Primed 
Impl ic it. 
Memory
1 . 0
Unprimed 
baseline )
C
0.0
Positive Neutral Depressed Physical
Threat
Valence
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comparison of means between depressives and controls by 
valence may be misleading. Therefore an additional 
ANOVA was performed to attempt to control for this 
general recall inhibition in depressives. Difference 
scores were formed such that for each subject their 
explicit recall of neutral words was subtracted from the 
number of words recalled for each valence. Thus, three 
different difference scores were formed for positive, 
depressed, and physical threat. For example, the 
formula for calculating the difference score for 
positive recall was as follows:
Positive CR - Neutral CR = Positive Difference Score 
As expected, a significant group by valence interaction 
was found, F(2,60)=5.9 p<.005.
Orthogonal contrasts of difference means showed 
that depressives had significantly higher depressed 
recall difference scores than did controls (see Table 
4). No significant difference was found between the two 
groups in physical threat or positive recall difference 
scores. Within the comparison group, the positive 
difference mean was significantly higher than the 
depressed difference score. Contrasts within the 
depressed group showed the opposite pattern. In this 
group the depressed difference score was significantly
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Table 4
Means of Difference Scores for Explicit 
Recall by Group and Valence
Valence
J Positive [ Depressed ! Physical j
Group !__________ 1____________{__Threat__!
ac b c
Depressed J -.24 [ .77 | -.18 |
i __  i____________ i___________i- | ! I I
ab c abc
Comparison I_.59 I -.59___J_____ .18____ J
Note: Means that share a letter are not significantly 
d if ferent.
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Figure 7
Means of Explicit Recall by Group and Valence
The means illustrated below represent the difference 
between valenced and neutral scores.
. 9 
.8 
. 7 
. 6 
. 5 
.4
Controlled 
Recall .3
. 2
. 1
0 
- . 1  
-.2 
-.3 
-.4 
-.5
Positive Depressed Physical
Threat
I ^ ^ a. ^  4;
I *T» 'T' “  *T“ #T*
J  * * * * *
| 4* 4* 4* 41
1 ~  *T* “  *T" ' r
V A L E N C E
Depressed Group: !*****!
Comparison Group: |_____ J
Note: "Controlled recall" is the mean number of items subjects
recalled in CR for a particular valence minus the number of 
neutral items recalled.
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higher than both positive and physical threat difference 
score means (see Table 4). Figure 7 was formed to 
illustrate this interaction. This figure shows a more 
symmetrical pattern of MCM bias than that suggested by 
the uncontrolled recall means illustrated in Figures 5 
and 6. Some caution should be expressed regarding this 
finding however. Some have suggested that it may not be 
appropriate to use difference scores with measures that 
may be correlated (Cronbach & Furby, 1970). Some 
moderate correlations were found between explicit recall 
of neutral items and recall of other affective valences 
(correlation coefficients ranging between . 3 3  and . 5 5 ) .
Hypothesis 2: Implicit Memory Bias.
Contrary to the prediction, no interaction between 
group, test, and valence was found for implicit memory,
F(3,90 ) =0.46, p=.71 . A significant main effect was 
found for test (F(1 ,30 ) = 5 3.47, p<.0001), thus
demonstrating priming. A significant, main effect was 
found for valence F(3,90 ) =3.49, p<.01. Here both groups 
tended to complete more of the depressed word 
completions, across both primed and unprimed 
conditions. No interaction was found between valence 
and group (F(3,90 ) = 1.01 , p=.39).
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Correlations between Implicit and Explicit Memory
To further investigate the relationship between 
explicit memory bias and implicit memory bias, 
correlations between explicit memory measures and 
implicit memory measures were calculated. Two different 
types of memory variables were compared. First, primed 
implicit memory was correlated with cued recall for each 
valence, For example, positive CR was correlated with 
positive primed word completion, neutral CR was compared 
with neutral primed word completion, etc. The 
relationship of these variables is shown in Table 5.
Secondly, two types of memory bias scores were 
calculated and compared. For the explicit condition 
recall scores for neutral words were used as a control 
condition and this number was subtracted from the recall 
hits for each of the other three affective valences. 
Thus, a bias score was formed for positive, depressed, 
and physical threat words for each subject. For 
example, the formula used for positive cued recall (CR) 
bias was as follows:
Positive Bias = Positive CR - Neutral CR 
Bias scores for the implicit condition were formed in a 
similar manner. However, in addition to using neutral 
scores as a control condition, the unprimed word 
completion score was also subtracted from each primed
Mood Congruent Memory 65 
valence score to control for response bias. For 
example, the formula for the implicit bias score for 
depressed words was as follows:
Depressed Implicit Bias = (DP - DUP) - (NP - NUP) 
where DP is the number of depressed word completions in 
the primed condition, DUP is the number of depressed 
word completions in the unprimed condition, NP is the 
number of neutral word completions in the primed 
condition, and NUP is the number of neutral word 
completions in the unprimed condition.
A second type of bias score was formed by 
subtracting the number of positive hits from the number 
of depressed hits. Thus, for CR the formula was as 
follows:
Positive/Negative CR Bias = Positive CR - Depressed CR
The formula for the implicit positive/negative bias also 
used the unprimed scores to control for response bias. 
Thus, the formula for implicit positive/negative bias 
was as follows:
Implicit Positive/Negative Bias = (PP-PUP) - (DP-DUP) 
where PP is the number of positive primed word 
completions, PUP is the number of positive unprimed word 
completions, DP is the number of depressed primed word 
completions and DUP is the number of depressed unprimed 
word completions. The correlations of the bias measures
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Table 5
Correlations between Cued Recall (CR) and Primed Word
Completion Scores for all Subjects.
Explicit Memory
Positive Neutral Depressed Physic
Threa
Positive .03 -.03 -.11 . 04
Neutral .13 -.01 .13 . 18
Depressed -.29 -.19 -.04 -.17
Physical -.18 - . 18 -.06 .09
Implicit Threat
Memory P-UP .02 . 02 . 03 . 3 2
N-UP .30 -.07 . 08 . 25
D-UP -.10 -.21 .11 . 06
PT-UP .31 -.25 .31 -.22
Note: No correlations were stat ist icallv
significant (P<.05 ) . Correlations of intere:
are printed in bold type. UP=unprimed 1
P=positive, N=neutral, D=depressed,
PT=physical threat
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Table 6
Correlations between CR and primed word completion
scores by group.
Comparison Group
Explicit Memory
Positive Neutral Depressed Physical
Threat
Positive -.03 . 03 .15 . 25
Implicit Neutral .31 -.03 -.04 .40
Memory Depressed -.10 - .21 .05 . 1 7
Physical
Threat
.01 - . 16 - . 07 .01
Depressed Group
Explicit Memory
Posit ive 
Positive -.21
Neutral 
- .21
Depressed
-.08
Physical
Threat
-.16
Implicit Neutral .07 -.01 . 22 . 05
Memory Depressed -.32 - . 17 -.21 - . 49*
Physical
Threat
-.19 -.25 -.06 .21
Note: * indicates statistical significance (p<.05). 
Correlations of interest are printed in bold type.
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Table 7
Correlations between Explicit and Implicit Bias 
Scores for all Subjects
Explicit Memory 
Bias Positive Depressed Physical
Bias .15 . 20 .04
Threat 
. 30
Implicit Positive .04 .04 -.12 .13
Memory Depressed - . 21
CM1 -.05 -.19
Physical -.08 -.12 -.04 .09
Threat
Note: "Bias" is the number of positive hits minus
negative hits, all other variables are bias scores 
computed with the number of neutral hits. No 
correlations were statistically significant (p<.05). 
Correlations of interest are printed in bold type.
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Table 8
Correlations between Explicit and Implicit Bias
scores by group.
Bias
Implicit Positive
Memory Depressed -.17
Physical -.05 
Threat
Comparison Group
Explicit Memory 
Bias
.12 -.08 
-.22 
-.17 
.16
21
Positive Depressed Physical
Threat 
-.17 .02
-.09 -.03
.10 -.07
.05 -.40
Bias
Implicit Positive
Depressed Group
Explicit Memory 
Bias 
-.04
Positive Depressed Physical
Threat
.27 -.46
.03 -.15
Memory Depressed .05 -.31
Physical -.08 -.24
Threat
-.20
-.39
-.23
.46
.01
.31
.33
Note: "Bias" is the number of positive hits minus 
negative hits, all other variables are bias scores 
computed with the number of neutral hits. No 
correlations were statistically significant (p<.05). 
Correlations of interest are printed in bold type.
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for all subjects and by group are found in Tables 7 and 
8 .
As observation of Tables 5 through 8 attests, 
measures of implicit and explicit memory by valence were 
not related in this experiment. The only correlation 
that approached statistical significance was in the 
depressed group between the depressed bias scores which 
were computed with the neutral words as a baseline.
This relationship was a negative one, the opposite of 
what one would predict if implicit memory bias was 
contributing to explicit memory bias in depressives.
Thus, in this study, if a depressed subject tended to 
exhibit an explicit memory bias, she was not likely to 
exhibit an implicit memory bias and vice versa.
Correlations Between Memory and State and Trait Measures
Correlations were also calculated between various 
state and trait measures and the memory scores that are 
discussed above. These correlations are summarized in 
Tables 9 through 12. Because of the large number of 
correlations calculated, a decision was made to set 
alpha level at a more conservative level (p<.01). In 
addition, because two distinct but internally homogenous 
groups were used in this study, most attention will be 
devoted to significant correlations that show the same
Table 9
Correlations of Recall Variables with 
State and Trait Measures
Memory Variable
Correlations of state 
measures
I1
BDI ! EPO-N! VAS! Dep
and t
POMS 
Vi gor
rai t 
! Fat
Positive variables
Positive CR -.50* -.60* - . 29 -.42* .41* -.46*
Positive WC -.01 -.27 -.17 -.30 .16 .31
Positive-Neutral CR -.15 - . 24 - . 21 - . 30 .22 - .18
Positive-Neutral WC .07 .00 . 20 .03 -.06 .12
Positive CR Bias -.52* -.67* -.41*-.46* .61* -.31
Positive WC Bias -.19 -.27 . 03 -.25 .12 - . 35
Depressed variables
Depressed CR -.06 .13 . 15 .07 -.26 .15
Depressed WC .34 . 28 . 05 .24 -.27 . 25
Depressed-Neutral CR . 34 . 39 . 16 .12 -.35 .10
Depressed-Neutral WC .26 . 26 .18 .27 -.18 .46*
Physical Threat (PT) Variables
Physical Threat CR -.30 -.44* - . 08 -.33 .19 -.50*
Physical Threat WC . 09 - . 01 . 04 -.08 -.21 - . 12
PT-Neutral CR . 04 - .12 - . 03 -.26 . 03 - . 24
PT-Neutral WC .11 .19 . 34 .09 -.18 .19
Note: "Positive bias" scores = positive - depressed
recall. CR=Cued Recall, WC=Word Completion, and PT= 
Physical Threat, Dep=POMS Depression factor, Vigor=POMS 
Vigor factor, Fat=POMS Fatigue factor. * indicates 
statistical significance at the p<.01 level.
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Table 10
Correlations of Pos itive Memory Variables
with State and Trait Measures by Group
Memory Variable
! G !
; r : 
! o ! 
! uj 
IP! BDI !
Correlations 
and trait
1
EPQ-N! VAS!
of state 
measures
POMS 
Dep!Vigor 1 Fat
Positive CR ! D ! - .42 -.23 -.05 . 07 .37 -.39
1 c l .21 -.49 .04 - . 48 . 03 - . 07
Positive WC ! d | .09 . 2 7 -.03 - .42 . 29 - . 30
! c ! - . 34 -.54 -.20 . 16 - . 22 - . 42
Positive-Neutral CR ! D | .14 - . 12 - . 3 - .27 . 23 -.06
I c | .46 .03 .28 - . 06 . 01 .02
Positive-Neutral WC | D 1 . 52 . 37 .51 . 24 -.08 . 52
! c | - . 32 -.24 -.05 - . 08 -.16 - . 28
Positive CR Bias | D | .03 -.27 -.01 . 33 .43 . 33
! C ! . 30 -.44 -.11 - .43 .37 -.18
Positive WC Bias ! D! - .10 . 42 .33 - . 38 .11 -.33
I C I - .04 -.52 . 03 . 02 - . 09 -.34
Note: "Positive Dias " scores = positive - depress ed
Recall. CR=Cued Recall, WC =Word Complet ion , Dep =POMS
Depression factor, Vigor=P0MS Vigor factor, Fat=P0MS 
Fatigue factor. D=Depressed group, C=Comparison 
group. No correlations were statistically significant 
at the p<.01 level.
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Table 11
Correlations of Depressed Memory Variables
with State and Trait Variables by Group
!G ! Correlations of state 
]R| and trait measures 
Memory Variable J 0 J
!U| | POMS
  !P ! BD1 1 EPQ-N VASI Pep I Vi£ori _ Fat
Depressed CR !D J-.39 .06 -.04 .25 -.09 -.60*
I C ! - . 04 -.17 .16 -.20 -.32___JLQ
Depressed WC [DJ.56* .20 .04 .36 -.28 .50
!C!.07 .17 -.31 -.36 -.08 -.24
Depressed-Neutral CR|Dj .13 .12 -.29 -.60*-.15 -.37
! CL^.30__. 3 3 ___.40___. .22.- .24__ J  _4
Depressed-Neutral WC[DJ .55 .04 .23 .49 -.15 .75*
_________________ 1C!-.34__j_37 -.09 -.12 -.08__ ^08
Note: CR=Cued Recall, WC=Word Completion, Dep=POMS 
Depression factor, Vigor=POMS Vigor factor, Fat=POMS 
Fatigue factor. D=Depressed group, C=Comparison 
group. * indicates significance at the p<.01 level.
Mood Congruent Memory
Table 12
Correlations between Physical Threat Memory Variables 
and State and Trait Measures by Group
Memory Variable
: g ; 
!R! 
! 0! 
! u 
IP! bdi ;
Correlations of state 
and trait, measures
I POMS 
EPQ-NI VAS! Dep|Vigor! Fat
Physical Threat CR ! d ; -.14 . 06 .39 . 03 -.26 -. 26
: c ■ . 09 -.58* -. 26 -.57* .10 -.63*
Physical Threat WC i d : -. 14 -.11 .12 - ,A2 -.23 -. 22
! ci_ . 36 -.16 -.. 30_ -.04 -.23 -. 26
PT-Neutral CR i d; . 40 .12 . 09 -.33 -.11 . 03
! c ; 50 - .07 . 07 -.20 .09 -.58*
PT-Neutral WC |D! . 28 .27 .58* .10 - . 18 . 28
|C|- .25 .09 . 05 -.•-13 .“,.2 5 . 10
Note: CR=Cued Recall, WC=Word Completion, PT=Phvsical 
Threat, Dep=POMS Depression factor, Vigor=POMS Vigor 
factor, Fat=POMS Fatigue factor. D=Depressed group, 
C = Comparison group. * indicates significance at: the 
p< . 01 level.
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correlation pattern within each separate group. Other 
correlations that show significance across all subjects 
but differing correlation patterns within each group, 
will be interpreted cautiously. The most consistent 
finding was the negative relationship between the EPQ 
Neuroticism scale (EPQ-N) and explicit recall of 
positive items (see Table 9). Cued recall (CR) of 
positive words and the positive CR bias were both 
negatively correlated with the EPQ-N. This negative 
relationship was also evident in the within group 
correlations (see Table 10). The BDI was also found to 
be negatively related to CR of positive items, as 
expected. Although this relationship did not hold in 
the comparison group, within group correlations showed 
this negative association in the depressed group. It 
seems that in this case the critical w’ithin group 
correlation was with the depressed group, because of tin 
low variance in depression scores in the comparison 
group. The homogeneity of varience in the comparison 
group would lower any correlations. The POMS Vigor 
subscale was positively related to CR of positive words 
and CR positive bias, however this result is somewhat 
equivocal because within group correlations showed this 
to be a stronger relationship in the depressed group 
than in the comparison group. Positive CR was
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negatively associated with most depression related 
variables, as might be expected. However, within group 
correlations showed that in the comparison group 
positive CR negatively correlated with the Depression 
factor of the POMS, while there was no relationship in 
the depression group between these variables (see Table 
10). Contrasting wTith this result, although a 
significant negative relationship was found between the 
Fatigue factor of the POMS and positive CR across 
groups, within group correlations found this 
relationship to be consistent in the depressed group, 
but not in the comparison group.
Correlational analyses with all subjects revealed 
few significant correlations with memory of depressed 
items. The one correlation that did prove to be 
significant was between the depressed minus neutral word 
completion score, and the Fatigue factor of the POMS. 
Within group correlations showed this was still a strong 
relationship within the depressed group (r=.75), while 
no relationship was demonstrated in the comparison 
group. Thus, as depressed subjects report more fatigue, 
they tend to remember more depressed items relative to 
neutral items in an implicit memory task.
Explicit memory of physical threat information was 
negatively associated with the EPQ-N and the Fatigue
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factor of the POMS. The relationship of physical threat 
CR with the EPQ-N appeared to be largely due to a 
negative association in the comparison group. However, 
the negative correlation between physical threat CR and 
the Fatigue factor of the POMS was found in separate 
correlations invovling both groups.
A NOVA f or J n tru s_i ons
In order to further investigate variables that 
might be related to the explicit memory bias, an 
analysis was undertaken to investigate the possibility 
of response bias. Incorrect responses on the cued 
recall task were recorded, and two advanced clinical 
psychology Ph.D. students and one Ph.D. rated the words 
as to whether they were positive, neutral, depressed, or 
physical threat. Instructions for rating were done in 
the same manner as rating for the original verbal 
stimuli as described in the methods section. These 
raters were kept blind to the diagnosis of the 
subjects. Only words with unanimous agreement among the 
three raters were used for analysis. In addition, 
neutral words were not analyzed since these words would 
not contribute to an understanding of response bias and 
mood congruent memory bias.
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Because of the high frequency of zeros in the data, 
it was determined that a nonparametric statistic should 
be used. Thus, Kruskal-Wallis tests were used to 
analyze this data. No group difference was found for 
positive intrusions (Chisquare approximation=0.00, 
p= . 98 ) . Similarly, no group difference was found fox- 
physical threat intrusions (Chisquare approximation:.24, 
p=.63). However, a significant group difference was 
found for depressed intrusions (Chisquare approximation 
=5.80, p<.01). Here, the comparison group actually had
more depressed intrusions than the depressed group.
These data are illustrated in Figure 8. From this 
diagram, it is apparent that the data are opposite to 
what one would expect if a response bias were 
contributing to the explicit memory bias.
Hypothesis 3: React ion Times :
Prior to the analysis of RT, trial times with very 
high or very low values (mean +3 s.d.) were eliminated. 
Thus, if the subject did not respond, i.e. they could 
not imagine a scene in 10 seconds, this score was 
eliminated from the analysis. If for any subject, more 
than 6 of the 16 RTs for each valence were eliminated, 
this subject was eliminated from the analysis. No 
subjects met this criterion for elimination. No main
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Figure 8
Interaction Between Group and Valence for Intrusions
in Cued Recall
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effects for group {F(1,32)=.02, p>.10), or valence 
( F( 3 , 96 ) = 1 . 3 , p>.10. A nonsignificant trend was noted 
for the interaction between valence and group 
(F=(3,96)2.14, p=.10. As seen in Figure 9, subjects in 
the depressed group tended to respond slower in 
imagining positive, neutral, and physical threat scenes, 
but tended to respond faster in imagining depressed 
scenes. All of these differences are small and were not 
significant, so it cannot be argued that differences in 
imagination RTs contributed to recall differences.
Pleasantness Ratings
As described in the procedure section, following 
the imagination task with each word, the subjects rated 
the pleasantness of the scene they imagined. These 
ratings were analyzed by group and by valence.
Significant main effects for group, F{1,32)=4.9, p<.03, 
and valence, F(3,96)=384.28, p<.0001, were found. As 
expected, scenes imagined wTith positive words were rated 
most pleasant, followed by neutral words. Both physical 
threat and depressed scenes were rated as more 
unpleasant than positive and neutral words, and imagined 
physical threat scenes were generally rated as more 
unpleasant than scenes with depressed words.
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Figure 9
Reaction Times by Valence and Group
4000
3500
C '
c
3000 H 1----------- 1----------- 1----------- h
Positive Neutral Depressed Physical
Threat
Depressed Group= D---------- D
Comparison Group= C---------- C
Note: RTs are latencies of time for a subject to imagine 
a scene involving themselves and the stimulus word, 
finding was due to differential rating of pleasantness.
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The main effect of valence was modified by a 
significant group by valence interaction (F(3,96)=3.82, 
pC.Ol). As illustrated in Figure 10, comparisons of 
means indicated that the depressed group generally rated 
the positive, neutral, and depressed scenes as less 
pleasant. Because the pattern of pleasantness ratings 
for the positive, neutral, and depressed scenes was the 
same for both groups, it cannot be argued that the MOM 
The interaction was found because no group differences 
were found in pleasantness ratings of the physical 
threat scenes, contrasting with the differences found 
with the other valences as described above.
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Figure 10
Pleasantness Ratings by Valence and Group
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D I S C U S S I O N
This study investigated the contribution of 
implicit memory processes to explicit mood congruent 
memory (MCM) bias in depression. Consistent with 
previous research (cf. Blaney, 1986), MCM was found in 
explicit memory. However, contrary to predictions, no 
MCM bias was found in implicit memory. In addition, 
correlation analyses between explicit memory measures 
and implicit measures indicated no relationship between 
the two. Thus, it may be concluded that the explicit 
MCM bias found in this study was not due to an implicit 
MCM bias.
Using Mandler’s (1980) framework of implicit and 
explicit memory, the current findings suggest that MCM 
bias in depression is primarily due to elaborative 
processes. Reviewing Mandler’s formulation of implicit 
and explicit memory, implicit memory is primarily a 
reflection of integration or priming. Priming is the 
extent the components of a schema (or words in this 
study) have been mutually activated in the past. Thus a 
more integrated word will be more easily activated when 
some of its components are presented. Explicit memory, 
in this case CR, reflects elaboration because 
elaboration involves the association of the schema or
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word with other information in memory. Thus, a more 
elaborated word is more easily retrieved because of more 
associations to other items in memory which results in 
more ’memory handles’ or cues to assist retrieval. As 
reviewed in the introduction, this formulation of 
implicit and explicit memory is supported by depth of 
processing research. If encoding encourages elaboration 
(deeper encoding), explicit memory is enhanced, but 
implicit memory is left unchanged.
Thus, the finding in this study of MCM in explicit 
memory but not implicit memory, suggests the involvement 
of elaborative processes in MCM in depression. In other 
words, for depressed subjects, depressive words were 
better elaborated, and tended to have more associations 
with other items in memory, than words of other 
affective valence. This pattern of data implies that 
depressed words received relatively more cognitive 
analysis than words of other emotional content, and thus 
were more easily retrieved. Conversely, positive words 
were better elaborated for nondepressed individuals, 
hence leading to recall advantage for words of positive 
hedonic valence.
One may argue that the observed MCM bias was due to 
a response bias. It may have been that depressives just 
guessed more frequently with depressed words, or
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controls guessed more frequently with positive words 
leading to more negative and positive hits, 
respectively. There are two reasons to doubt this 
explanation. First, research in cognitive psychology 
has shown that manipulation of response bias does little 
to change most recall measures unless there is a high 
degree of probability of guessing the correct response 
(e.g. recognition; Erdelyi, Finks, & Feigin-Pfau, J989; 
Roediger & Payne, 1985; Roediger, Srinivas, & Waddill, 
1989). Secondly, the analysis of intrusions in the cued 
recall (CR) task contradicts the response bias 
hypothesis. This analysis showed that control subjects 
had significantly more depressed word intrusions than 
did depressed subjects. Thus, these data argue against 
the explanation that the MCM bias in explicit memory was 
due to a response bias.
The pattern of memory bias in explicit and implicit 
memory found here contrasts with that found with anxiety 
subjects. Mathews et al. (1989), found that while
anxious subjects showed a clear implicit MCM bias, they 
found only a nonsignificant MCM trend in explicit 
memory. This study found no MCM in implicit memory, and 
a strong explicit MCM bias. Correlational analyses in 
both studies indicated that MCM biases in explicit and 
implicit memory were not related. Thus, it appears that
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depressives tend to process mood congruent information 
extensively, while anxious subjects do not. Conversely, 
mood congruent memories are easily activated for anxious 
subjects, while mood congruent memories for depressives 
are no more easily primed than they are for controls.
This interpretation has some intuitive appeal.
While anxious thoughts are activated easily for anxious 
individuals, they attempt to avoid dwelling on them 
because of their anxiety provoking nature. On the other 
hand, depressed words are not activated any easier for 
depressives than for nondepressed individuals, but when 
they are activated, these individuals tend to dwell on 
these memories and process them extensively which leads 
to better recall of depressive information and may 
influence the depressives outlook on their environment.
This interpretation is also consistent with the 
attentional bias data discussed in the introduction. 
Anxious individuals tend to allocate their attention 
toward mood congruent stimuli, but depressives show no 
immediate attentional bias (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 
1986). There exists some data that suggests that 
attended words are more readily primed than nonattended 
words in implicit memory tasks (Eich, 1984; Jacoby and 
Brooks, 1984). Thus, one might speculate that the 
increased priming of mood congruent information in
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anxious subjects may relate to an attentional bias, and 
the lack of any differential priming in depressives may 
relate to the lack of an attentional bias. Clearly, 
this speculation extends beyond known data, and the 
relationship of attention bias to implicit and explicit 
memory bias needs to be tested directiy.
At this point one may note the similarity of 
elboration in Mandler’s framework, and the clinical, 
phenomena of rumination. It seems to follow, that if an 
individual dwells on or ruminates about particular 
information, then this information would be better 
elaborated and thus be more retrievable. Recently Nolen 
Hoeksema (1987) has proposed a response styles theory of 
depression. She suggested that individuals w^ ho tend to 
ruminate in response to depressed mood will tend to 
maintain the depressed mood longer and perhaps even 
exacerbate the negative mood state. These researchers 
have presented some evidence in support of this 
formulation (Morrow & Nolan-Hoeksema, 1990). Thus, it
is possible that individuals who become depressed tend 
to ruminate, and this rumination tends to be focused on 
mood congruent information which results in the MCM bias 
and the maintenance of depressed mood. Future research 
could investigate this notion further by manipulating 
rumination similar to the methodology of Morrow and
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Nolen-Hoeksema (1990), and then testing for MCM bias.
The reader might note the similarilty of Nolan- 
Hoeksema’s (1987) response styles theory of depression 
and Eysenck’s (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1963) theory of 
neuroticism. In this regard it should be recalled that 
the most consistent relationships observed with recall 
were negative associations between recall of positive 
vairiables, and the Neuroticism scale of the EPQ. Thus, 
it is possible that depressed mood may interact with 
neuroticism or a tendency to ruminate, to produce the 
observed explicit MCM bias.
Explicit Memory Findings
Several aspects of the observed MCM bias in 
explicit memory should be discussed. First, the effect 
appeared to be more of a positive bias for comparison 
subjects, than a negative bias for depressives. As 
noted in the introduction, this result is consistent 
with the bulk of past research on MCM (cf. Blaney,
1986). This interpretation of the data would suggest 
that depression may decrease the retrievabilitv of 
positive information more so than it increases retrieval 
of negative information. However, this apparent 
asymmetry in the MCM effect may be due to the fact that 
depressives generally recall less information regardless
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of affective valence. As shown in the ANOVA of 
difference scores and illustrated in Figure 7, when this 
general recall difference is controlled, a more 
symmetrical pattern of memory bias results. In other 
words, the depressed subject’s MCM bias was a similar 
pattern to the control’s MCM bias, but in the opposite 
direction. Thus, this study demonstrated the importance 
of including a neutral word category in future studies 
of MCM to control for the general recall inhibition 
usually found to be associated with depress ion.
Second, in this study MCM was demonstrated with 
cued recall (CR) . As stated earlier, most studies of 
MCM used free recall (FR) as the dependent measure. The 
finding of MCM with CR suggests that adding some memory 
cues does not significantly change the MCM pattern.
The third finding of importance was the specificity 
of the observed MCM effect. Comparisons of means within 
the depressed group showed that they recalled more 
depressed words than physical threat words. Conversely, 
there was no difference in the recall of depressed and 
physical threat words for controls. Thus, it does not 
appear that the MCM effect relates to all negative 
information. Rather, it appears to be related to words 
more specific to depression. This result supports 
Beck’s (1967; 1972) theory regarding the cognitive 
content specificity of depressive schemata, and Bower’s
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(1980) theory regarding differing emotion nodes in 
memory.
Beck has suggested that depressogenic schema are 
activated in depression and these cognitive structures 
contain information related to the negative cognitive 
triad (negative thoughts about the self, the world, and 
the future). Thus, the words found in the depressed 
hedonic valence category in this study would correspond 
to information Beck argues would be contained in 
depressogenic schemata. On the other hand, Information 
that is contained in schemata that are activated in 
anxiety states include thoughts related to threat and 
vulnerability (Beck & Emory, 1985). The words found in 
the physical threat category would correspond to this 
schema. Thus, the finding of a memory bias with 
depressed words, but not with words of physical threat 
corresponds with Beck theory regarding the content 
specificity of cognitive schemata.
If mood is the primary variable responsible for 
negative memory bias, then one would expect state or 
mood variables to be related to MCM bias. Thus, the 
more severe the depression, the greater the negative 
memory bias. One would expect that BDI scores would be 
most clearly related to a negative memory bias.
Correlation analyses across groups supported this notion
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only with positive recall variables, and within group 
correlations supported this result in the depression 
group.
This result appears to be inconsistent, with other 
studies investigating MCM in depression. Several 
studies have failed to find a relationship between MCM 
and mood state variables (Mathews & Bradley, 1983;
Riskind, 1983; Riskind, Rholes, & Eggers, 1982). In 
addition, Gilligan and Bower (1984) reviewed a number of 
unpublished experiments conducted in their laboratory 
and also reported no relationship between the extent of 
sadness and MCM bias. However, all of these studies 
used mood induction methodologies to vary mood, and as 
argued earlier, these induction procedures may not vary 
mood to the extent as that found in clinical 
depression. Corroborating this suggestion, no MCM 
association with extent of depression was found in the 
comparison group, where extent of depressed mood is 
assumed to have little variation. In one of the early 
studies of MCM (Lloyd & Lishman, 1975), depressives were 
asked to recall positive and negative events from their 
lives and latencies were recorded. In this study, the 
expected MCM correlation with recall latencies was found 
which is consistent with the findings of this study.
Thus, one may expect to find a relationship between MCM
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bias and depressed mood with depressed subjects, but 
will not be likely to find this association in groups 
where depressed mood is not as extensive.
While the expected relationships were demonstrated 
in correlations of state and trait varibles with recall 
of positive information, expected associations were not 
found with explicit recall of depressed words. Thus, 
the I'elationship between depressed mood and increased 
retrievability of congruent information is not 
completely clear. It is possible that MCM is related to 
some other aspect of depression other than depressed 
mood. As discussed earlier, in the current study the 
variable that seemed to be most ciearly related to lack 
of recall of positive items was the Neuroticism scale of 
the EPQ. Thus, the current results replicate the 
findings of Martin, Ward, and Clark (1983), who found 
subjects with high Neuroticism score recalled more 
negative information than those with low Neurotiscism 
score. This memory recall bias was found to be 
independent of mood. The Neuroticism scale is assumed 
to be a trait variable different from the state variable 
of mood assumed by most theorists to be important in 
MCM. It is possible that mood might interact with 
neuroticism to produce the MCM bias. Thus, future 
research should attempt to tease out the impact of
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neuroticism versus depressed mood on MCM bias. One way 
of investigating this issue would be to choose two 
groups of subjects based on high and low neuroticism 
scores. Then one could randomly assign half of the 
subjects in both groups to a depressed mood induction, 
and the other half to a positive mood induction. 
Following mood induction all subjects would encode words 
of various affective valences followed by a recall test.
Implicit Memory Findings
A significant differential priming effect was not 
found between groups in the implicit memory condition. 
Results from the correlational analyses in the depressed 
group suggested that word completion of depressed primed 
words was associated with state measures that one would 
normally associate with depression (the BDI and the 
Depression and Fatigue factors of the POMS). However, 
these relationships were not evident in the comparison 
group, only a few of the expected correlations with 
implicit memory measures were found, and it is clear no 
MCM bias was found in implicit memory.
There are several possible explanations for the 
failure to find an implicit MCM bias. First, it is 
possible that the implicit memory measure was 
insensitive for detecting differential priming of
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information of differing hedonic valence. However,
Mathews et al. (1989) found an implicit MCM memory bias
with anxiety subjects using a similar methodology. 
Therefore, unless the implicit MCM bias in depression is 
weaker than that found in anxiety subjects, it would be 
difficult to argue that this methodology was insensitive 
to finding an implicit MCM bias.
A second and related possibility is that it may be 
more difficult for priming to be demonstrated for 
depressed words because of the high completion rate of 
unprimed depressed words. Both groups correctly 
completed depressed unprimed words more frequently than 
words of the other affective valences. Thus, it is 
possible that this high rate of unprimed completions 
made it more difficult for differential priming to be 
demonstrated for depressed information. However, for 
this argument to be valid, one must also argue that the 
rate of completed primed depressed words was insensitive 
because of a ceiling effect. The argument here would be 
that since the unprimed rate for depressed words was 
generally higher, this did not allow for further 
improvement in the primed condition. As seen in Table 
3, mean priming rates for depressed words varied between 
two and two and a half words out of a possible eight.
Thus, a ceiling effect seems unlikely. All of the
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alternative hypotheses for the lack of finding an 
implicit MCM bias seem unlikely.
Virtually no other studies have investigated 
implicit MCM bias in depression. Only one other study 
has used an implicit memory measure to evaluate the 
processing of emotional information in depression 
(Segal, Hood, Shaw, & Higgins, 1988). Although these 
researchers found a significant priming effect for self- 
schema relevant words, affective valence of the words 
was not manipulated so this study does not directly 
relate to the current study.
Theoretical Implications
Currently, theorizing of implicit and explicit 
memory in cognitive psychology is in a state of flux. 
Several recent review's (McKoon, Rat] iff, & Dell, 1986; 
Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988) have questioned the 
activation/elaboration view of implicit/explicit 
memory. Most theorists who follow the implicit/explicit 
distinction assert that implicit memory tasks activate 
an abstract schema devoid of contextual information. 
According to these theorists, explicit memory involves 
elaboration which includes associations of the schema to 
information of environmental context. For example, when 
a student is asked in a test to recall information from
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a lecture, she may use memory cues from the lecture in 
addition to the information asked for (like anecdotes) 
to assist her in recalling the needed information.
These memory cues would be an example of contextual 
information that is used in explicit memory, but not in 
implicit memory.
One of the most cited alternative views is the data 
driven versus conceptually driven distinction made by 
Roediger and associates (Roediger, 1984; Blaxton, 1985; 
Roediger & Blaxton, 1987). Data driven tests are those 
tests where subjects are asked to primarily operate on 
the perceptual information that they are given. Thus, 
most implicit memory tests may be seen as data driven. 
Conceptually driven tests are those in which subjects 
are asked to mentally reconstruct the study episode (the 
episode in which the material to be remembered is 
originally presented). Most explicit tests are seen as 
conceptually driven. However, some explicit tests may 
be seen to be as a combination of data driven and 
conceptually driven tests. For example, in the CR task 
used in this study, subjects were given perceptual 
information on which to operate, but they were also 
asked to reconstruct a previous episode with this 
perceptual information. The data regarding implicit and 
explicit tests investigating linguistic and perceptual
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contexts appears to follow the data driven/conceptually 
driven dichotomy more than the implicit/explicit 
distinction. For example, when bilingual subjects are 
exposed to a word in one language, implicit priming will 
not be observed in another language, whereas explicit 
memory is not affected by linguistic context (for a 
review see Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988). Further, 
if the type of letters are changed from study to test 
then implicit priming is attenuated whereas explicit 
memory is not. For example, if words are studied in 
small case letters, priming is greater if letter stems 
are given at testing in small case rather than in block 
letters. However, this change in letter type has little 
effect on explicit memory. These two findings clearly 
follow the data driven/conceptually driven account and 
would not be predicted by most implicit/explicit memory 
theorists who assert that an abstract concept devoid of 
contextual detail is activated in priming.
However, some studies (Cermak, Talbot, Chandler, & 
Wolbarst, 1985; Diamond & Rozin, 1984; Graf &• Schacter, 
1985; Osgood & Hoosain, 1974; Schacter, 1985; Schacter & 
Graf, 1986; Schacter & Whitfield, .1986) have found 
results inconistent with the data driven/conceptually 
driven distinction. For example, this approach does not 
account well for the finding that some types of priming
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(e.g. free association) depend on whether the phrase is 
one in which the words regularly occur together. In 
such experiments a subject is more likely to complete
the primed association GREEN-______  as "GREEN-PASTURES"
than the primed phrase "green-book". Additionally, the 
data driven/conceptually driven distinction does not 
explain why amnesics fail to show priming with 
nonwords. These and several other findings (cf. 
Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988) are not consistent 
with the position taken by Roediger.
Richardson-Klavehn and Bjork (1988) concluded their 
review with the assertion that an adequate theory of 
implicit and explicit memory must integrate components 
of both the abstractionist and the data driven/ 
conceptually driven viewpoints. In this regard,
Handler’s approach seems to be a useful integration of 
the data driven/conceptually driven and abstract 
activation/elaboration accounts. Although Mandler’s 
approach basically agrees with the activation/ 
elaboration account of implicit and explicit memory, 
Handler does not argue that activation is necessarily 
that of a abstract concept devoid of context. As was 
discussed in the introduction, Handler (1980) states 
that activation/integration is tied to the phonological/ 
perceptual characteristics of the stimuli. In this
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regard, Mandler’s approach appears to account well for 
the linguistic/perceptual context effects described 
above .
If however one were to accept the data driven/ 
conceptually driven account of implicit and explicit 
memory, it would not necessarily change the practical 
implications of the findings presented here. It appears 
that when depressives are asked to mentally construct a 
previous episode (conceptually driven task), they have 
more difficulty constructing a positive episode than 
nondepressed individuals. However, when partial data 
are presented to a depressed individual (data driven 
task), they are not as likely to produce mood congruent 
information as in the conceptually driven situation. 
Thus, it is the conceptually driven situation that tends 
to more readily show the MCM effect. This approach 
would still appear to support the interpretation that 
MCM in depression appears to rely less on automatic 
processes, and more on cognitive operations such as 
elaboration. Conceptually driven tests by definition 
involve more elaborative processes because elaboration 
refers to the extent a memory is associated with other 
items in memory and conceptually driven tests ask the 
subject to reconstruct a previous episode which must 
involve associations to other memories. Thus, it
100
Mood Congruent Memory 
appears that if one opts for the data driven/ 
conceptually driven account of implicit/explicit memory, 
it does not significantly endanger the elaboration 
interpretat ion.
The findings of this study also relate to Beck’s 
cognitive theory of depression and anxiety (Beck, 1967; 
Beck & Emery, 1985; Beck et al., 1979). As stated 
earlier, the finding that depressives showed an explicit 
MCM bias with depressed related words, but not with 
those related to physical threat supports his notion of 
cognitive content specificity. However, Beck’s theory 
suggests that the main differences between depression 
and anxiety relate to cognitive content. Data are now 
converging to suggest important cognitive process 
differences in addition to differences in cognitive 
content. As reviewed earlier, mood congruent attention 
allocation biases have been found with anxiety subjects 
but not with depressives (McCloud et al., 1986; Gotlib 
et al., 1988). In addition, implicit memory bias has
been demonstrated with anxiety patients, but generally 
researchers have failed to find an explicit MCM bias in 
anxiety subjects (e.g. Mathews et al., 1989). As 
demonstrated in this study, depressives show the 
opposite pattern in that they have an explicit MCM bias, 
but no implicit MCM bias. Beck’s cognitive theory of
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emotional disorders does not account well for these 
findings. In addition, it does not appear to follow 
from Beck’s account of depression that MCM biases would 
be found with one type of memory, but would not be found 
in another type of memory. Thus, it appears that Beck’s 
theory is at least incomplete.
Williams, Watts, MacLoed, and Mathews (1988) have 
offered a cognitive theory of anxiety and depression 
t.hat. appears to predict the findings of the current 
study well. Following the framework of Mandler, they 
proposed that because of the functional properties of 
anxiety, cognitive resources are allocated more at the 
preattentive stage which includes attention allocation 
and perceptual memory or priming. On the other hand, 
they suggest that in depression cognitive resources are 
allocated more toward mood congruency in the elaboration 
stage which is presumed to follow the preattentive 
stage. Thus, the finding here that depressives show a 
mood congruent bias in explicit memory but not in 
implicit memory, directly supports this cognitive model 
of depression.
As one may recall, Mandler argues that implicit 
memory is more reflective of automatic processes, while 
more control procedures are involved in explicit 
memory. Thus, these findings imply that MCM bias .is not
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a completely automatic phenomena and controlled 
processes may be involved. This raises questions as to 
the appropriateness of Beck’s use of the term "automatic 
thought". In brief, Beck argues that depressed mood is 
the result of automatic thoughts which result from the 
activation of the depressogenic schemata which is 
reflected in dysfunctional attitudes. Beck’s use of 
"automatic" is not clearly specified, although he seems 
to imply that the thought is not voluntary, or the 
patient does not ’try to think’ these thoughts. It. does 
not appear that Beck’s use of the term "automatic 
thought" directly corresponds to the construct of 
automatic as it is used in cognitive psychology. The 
results here suggest that controlled procedures may be 
involved in the negative thinking or memory of 
depressives. Thus, the concept of "automatic thought" 
appears to need further operationalization, and this may 
help to determine the exact nature of the negative 
thinking bias in depression. This theory development 
would direct future research into cognitive processes in 
depression, and may have important treatment 
implications as well.
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Conclusions
This study found a MCM bias in explicit memory, but 
no such memory bias in implicit memory for depression. 
Thus, although depression makes mood congruent memories 
more retrievable, they are not necessarily more 
accessible. Seen in a different framework, when asked 
to mentally reconstruct a previous episode (conceptually 
driven task), depressives tend to recall mood congruent 
memories. However, when asked to produce responses to 
perceptual stimuli, depressives do not respond 
frequently with recently learned mood congruent 
information. The results of this study suggest that the 
primary mechanism for the explicit MCM bias found is 
elaboration. The pattern of results did not support 
ease of activation, or response bias accounts of MCM.
In addition, the lack of association between explicit 
MCM and implicit MCM implies that these two forms of 
memory bias do not share the same cognitive processes.
If MCM proves to be an important maintenance mechanism 
in depression, the results here imply that cognitive 
elaboration may best explain why depressives bias their 
memory toward negative material. It is possible that 
cognitive and other treatments for depression are 
effective in that they interfere with, or modify this 
elaborative process, which lends depressed information
104
Mood Congruent Memory 
less retrievable thus resulting in the relief of 
depressed emotion. If future research corroborates 
cognitive elaboration as a critical mechanism underlying 
MCM, then treatment approaches to depression may be 
enhanced by investigating more effective ways to modify 
this elabonative process.
Several suggestions may be made for future 
research. Further investigation of encoding processes 
and their effect on implicit and explicit memory may 
also shed light, on the mechanisms under! ving MCM. The 
results here w'ould predict that encouraging elaboration 
in encoding would enhance the mood congruent effect.
The encoding task used here encouraged elaboration. 
Manipulation of encoding (e.g. semantic versus 
structural) may help us better understand the importance 
of elaboration in MCM. The manipulation of retrieval 
strategies may also shed light on the process of MCM 
(e.g. Anderson & Pichert, , 1 978). Secondly, future
research should attempt to disentangle the participation 
of mood in MCM, and other valuables such as 
neuroticism. Related to this, the results here may 
suggest the importance of rumination in depressed MCM. 
Thus, further operationalization of rumination and 
elaboration is needed so that future research can
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identify these cognitive mechanisms and further 
investigate their importance in MCM.
This study showed that MCM is found in explicit 
memory but not in implicit memory. This finding 
supports the suggestion that elaborative mechanisms may 
be an important variable underlying explicit MCM bias. 
Thus, future research should use other methodologies to 
investigate the participation of elaboration in MCM. 1 
further progress is made in identifying this cognitive 
mechanism, and this mechanism proves to be important in 
MCM, cognitive treatments of depression may be improved 
by determining treatment strategies that may more 
effectively intervene in this process.
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Appendix A 
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI)
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not been filmed at the request of the author. 
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in the author’s university library.
130-132, Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) 
134-141, Schedule for Affective Disorders and 
Schizophrenia (SADS) Depression Section
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Appendix B
Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia (SADS)
Depression Section
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Appendix C 
Visual Analogue Scale (VAS)
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NAME______________________________________________________
On the line below please indicate how sad or depressed 
you are feeling right now, a s you can see, the left hash 
mark represents "normal mood" and the right hash mark 
represents "extreme depression". Please place a vertical 
slash on the line at the point which you feel best 
represents your mood right now.
extreme 
depression
normal
mood
Appendix D 
Profile of Mood States (POMS)
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147- 1 4 9 , Eysenk Personality Questionnaire
(EPQ)
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bal section)
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Appendix E 
Eysenk Personality Questionnaire (EPQ)
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Appendix F 
Shipley Institutes of Living Scale 
(verbal section)
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Appendix G 
Verbal stimuli
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STIMULUS LIST
I NEUTRAL______ I DEPRESSED I PHYSICAL THREAT IPOSITIVE
calm (35) 
poise (6) 
lively (26) 
comfort (43)
A cheerful (10) 
creative (49) 
di l igent (2) 
vivacious (3)
trust (52) 
bliss (4) 
elated (3 ) 
prosper (3)
B decisive (19 ) 
carefree (9) 
reassure (5) 
refreshed (5)
relax (19) 
secure (30 ) 
serene (10) 
respect (125)
C rejoice (1) 
delight (29) 
tranquil (2) 
conf ident (16)
post (84) 
pear (8) 
powder (28) 
boulder (11) 
nutmeg (4) 
purchase (47) 
latitude (5) 
storeroom (1)
brown (176) 
fringe (16) 
cruise (2) 
shampoo (2) 
circuit (23) 
wardrobe (8) 
catalogue (8) 
chronic1e (5)
bath (26) 
tract (17) 
shower (15) 
author (46) 
molecule (6) 
costume (10) 
forehead (16) 
pe n insula (9)
pa n ic (22) 
alone (19 5) 
stupid (24) 
defeat (31) 
regret (9) 
despised (3) 
criticize (4) 
disapprove (4)
fail (37) 
dread (9 ) 
remorse (1) 
guilty (29) 
hopeless (14) 
dejorived (8)
1istless (1) 
persecute (3)
empty (64) 
scorn (4) 
insult (7 ) 
beaten (15) 
hostile (19) 
infer lor (7) 
impotent (2) 
worthless (3)
stab (3) 
victim (27) 
cancer (25) 
funeral (33) 
assault (15) 
collapse (7) 
m u t ilate (3) 
incurable (2)
harm (25) 
fatal (19) 
hearse (1) 
attack (105) 
fracture (1) 
coronary (7) 
ambulance (6) 
suffocate (5)
pa in (88) 
wound (28) 
lethal (5) 
coffin (7) 
strangle (6) 
a c c ident (41) 
casualty (3) 
paralysis (6)
The above lists the stimuli used In the described 
experiment. Word frequencies are given in parentheses, and 
the three or four letter word stem used in the cued recall 
and word completion tasks are shown by underline.
Appendix H 
Scoring Guide for Correct Responses
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Acceptable responses for presented word stems.
cal____________ calm, calmed, calming, calmly
pol____________ poise, poised
liv____________ lively, livliest
com____________ comfort, comforted, comforting, comfortable
tal____________ talented, talent
ere____________ creative, creativity
tran__________  tranquil, tranquility
viv____________ vivacious, vivaciously
pos____________ post
pea____________ pear
pow____________ powder, powdered, powdering
bou____________ boulder, bouldered, bouldering
nut____________ nutmeg
pur____________ purchase, purchased, purchasing
lat____________ latitude
tele__________  telescope, telescoped, telescoping
pan____________panic, paniced, panicing
alo____________ alone
stu____________stupid, stupidity
defe___________ defeat, defeated, defeating
reg____________ regret, regretful, regretting, regretted
infe___________ inferior, inferiority
cri____________ criticize, criticized, criticizing, critical
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disa____________disapprove, disapproved, disapproving,
d isapproval
sta____________ stab, stabbed, stabbing
vie____________ victim, victimized
can____________ cancer
fun____________ funeral
ass____________ assault, assaulted, assaulting, assaultive
coll___________ collapse, collapsed
mut____________ mutilate, mutilated, mutilating
incu incurable
tru____________trust, trusted, trusting, trustworthy
bli____________ bliss, blissful
ela____________ elated, elate
pros___________ prosper, prospered, prospering, prosperity
deci___________ decisive, decisiveness
car____________ carefree
reas___________ reassure, reassured, reassuring
ref____________ refreshed, refresh, refreshing
sto____________ story, storied
fri____________fringe, fringed, fringing
cru____________ cruise, cruised, cruising, cruiser
sha____________ shampoo, shampooing, shampooed
cir____________ circuit, circuiting, circuited
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san____________ sandwich, sandwiches
for____________forehead, foreheads
chro___________ chronicle, chronicled
wea____________ weak, weaken, weakened, weakening
drea___________ dread, dreaded, dreading, dreadful
rem____________ remorse, remorseful
hop____________ hopeless, hopelessness
gui____________ guilty, guilt
dep____________ deprived, deprive, depriving
lis____________ listless, listlessness
pers___________ persecute, persecuting, persecuted
har____________ harm, harmed, harming
fat____________ fatal, fatality, fatally
hea____________ hearse, hearst (?)
att____________ attack, attacked, attacking
frac___________ fracture, fractured, fracturing
cor____________ coronary
amb____________ ambulance
suf____________ suffocate, suffocating, suffocated
rela___________ relax, relaxed, relaxing
sec____________ secure, secured, securing
res____________ respect, respected, respecting, respectful,
respectfully 
ser____________ serene, serenity
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rej____________ rejoice, rejoiced, rejoicing
deli___________ delight, delighted, delightful, delighting
dil____________ diligent, diligently
conf___________ confident, confidently
bat____________ bath, bathing, bathed
trai___________trail, trailed, trailing
aut____________ author, authored, authoring
sho____________ shower, showered, showering
mole__________  molecule
cos____________ costume, costuming, costumed
pub____________ publisher, publishing, published, publishings,
publishers
lnte___________ interpret, Interpreting, interpreted,
interprets
emp____________ empty, emptied, emptying
sco____________ scorn, scorned, scorning
bea____________ beaten, beat, beating
insu___________ insult, insulted, insulting
hos____________ hostile, hostility
desp___________ despised, despise, despising, despicable
impo___________ impotent
wor____________ worthless, worthlessness
pai____________ pain, pained
wou____________ wound, wounded, wounding
cof f___________ coffin
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let____________ lethal, lethality
stra___________ strangle, strangled, strangling
acc____________ accident, accidentally
cas____________ casualty
para___________ paralysis, paralyzed, paralyzing
VITA
PERSONAL DATA Fall 1990
Name: Philip Charles Watkins
Title: Assistant Professor
Home Address:
319 Lincoln 
Cheney, WA. 99004
Home Phone:
(509) 235-5998 
Office Address:
Department of Psychology 
MS-94
Eastern Washington University 
Cheney, WA. 99004
Office Phone:
(509) 359-6174
EDUCATION
1990 Ph.D. Louisiana State University
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 
Major: Clinical Psychology 
Minor: Behavioral Neurology
1987 M.A. Louisiana State University
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 
Major: Psychology
1983 M.A. Western Baptist Seminary
Portland, Oregon 
Major: Psychology
1980 B.S. University of Oregon
Eugene, Oregon 
Major: Psychology
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE 
Research Experience
1986-1988 Research Assistant, Louisiana State
University, Baton Rouge, La. 
Responsibilities included literature 
search, organization of data, computer 
analysis of data using SAS, collection 
of data, organization of research 
projects. Supervisor: Dr. Donald A. 
Williamson, Ph.D.
160
Mood Congruent Memory 16
1982-1984
Teaching Experience
1990-present
1988-1989
1985-1986
1989-1990
1984-1985
Clinical Experience
1988-Sept. 1988
Research Assistant. Portland, OR. 
Organization, administration, and data 
collection of 60 subject treatment 
outcome study concerning the cognitive 
treatment of depression. Supervisor: 
Dr. Rebecca Propst., Ph.D.
Assistant Professor, Psychology 
Department, Eastern Washington 
University, Cheney, WA. Supervisor: Dr. 
William Williams, Ph.D.
Instructor, Louisiana State University. 
Taught adolescent psychology for three 
semesters as half time instructor. 
Supervisor: Dr. James Geer, Ph.D.
Teaching Assistant, Abnormal Psychology 
Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge 
Louisiana. Responsibilities included 
lecturing, formation, administration, 
and scoring of exams. Supervisor: Dr. 
Yvonne Osborne, Ph.D.
Psychology Intern, University of 
Southern California-L.A . County Medical 
Center. Responsibilities include both 
clinical and research activities. 
Supervisor: Dr. Norm Tiber, Ph.D.
Teaching Assistant, Experimental 
Psychology, Louisiana State University, 
Baton Rouge, La. Responsibilities 
included scoring tests, directing lab. 
Instructor: Dr. Robert Mathews, Ph.D.
Therapist, Parkland Hospital, Baton 
Rouge, LA. Served as therapist on 
eating disorders team. Responsibilities 
included eating disorder assessments, 
individual and group eating disorder 
therapy. Supervisor, Dr. Donald A. 
Williamson, Ph.D.
Mood Congruent Memory 162
1987-May, 1988 Mental Health Technician, Parkland
Hospital, Baton Rouge, La. Worked with 
various eating disordered patients 
(primarily Bulimia Nervosa). Supervisor: 
Dr. Donald A. Williamson, Ph.D.
1987-1988 Practicum, Psychological Services
Center, Louisiana State University,
Baton Rouge, La. Assessment and 
treatment of various eating disordered 
patients. Primary therapist: Binge-eat 
obesity group. Assessment and treatment 
of affective disorders. Primary 
therapist: Unipolar Depression group. 
Supervisor: Dr. Donald A. Williamson,
Ph. D.
1986-1987 Practicum, Psychological Services
Center, Louisiana State University,
Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Assessment of 
various eating disordered patients, 
student co-therapist with family group, 
and obesity group. Supervisor: Dr. 
Donald A. Williamson, Ph.D.
1985-1986 Practicum, Psychological Services
Center, Louisiana State University,
Baton Rouge, La. Assessment and 
treatment of children and adolescents. 
Supervisor: Dr. Johnny Matson, Ph.D.
1984-1985 Practicum, Psychological Services
Center, Louisiana State University,
Baton Rouge, La. Assessment and 
treatment of adult patients.
Supervisor: Dr. William F. Waters, Ph.D.
1982-1983 Practicum, George Fox College, Newberg,
Oregon. Assessment and treatment of 
students at this liberal arts college. 
Supervisor: Dr. Emory Nester, Ed.D.
1981-1982 Practicum, Western Psychological
Services, Portland Oregon. Assessment 
and treatment of adult disorders. 
Supervisor: Dr. Emory Nester, Ed.D.
Mood Congruent Memory 163
OTHER POSITIONS HELD
1985-1986 Served as student representative to the to
the Clinical Training Committee, Louisiana 
State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
PUBLICATIONS
Propst, L. R., Pardington, A., Ostrom, D., & Watkins, P.
(1986). Predictors of coping in divorced single mothers. 
Journal of Divorce, 9, 3, 3 3-53.
Watkins, P. C., Gouvier, W. L., Gallon, E., & Barkemeyer,
C. (1989). Equivalence of items on the Mini-Mental State. 
Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology, 4, 381-384.
Watkins, P. C. , Williamson, D. A., & Falkowski., C . ( 19 90)
Prospective assessment of Late-Luteal Dysphoria. Journal 
of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment. .
Williamson, D. A., Davis, C. ,J., Goreczny, A., Bennett,
S. M., & Watkins, P. C. (1989). The Eating Questionnaire 
Revised: A new symptom checklist for bulimia. In P. A. 
Keller & C. G. Ritt. (Eds. ), Innovations in clinical 
practice: A source book. Sarasota, Fla.: Professional 
Resource Exchange Inc.
Williamson, D. A., Davis, C. J., Duchman, E. G., McKenzie,
S. J., & Watkins, P. C. (1990). Assessment, of eating 
disorders: Obesity. Anorexia, and Bulimia Nervos_a. New 
York: Pergamon.
Williamson, D. A., Prather, R. C., Bennett, S. M., Davis, C. 
,J., Watkins, P. C., & Grenier, C. (1989). An uncontrolled 
evaluation of inpatient and outpatient Cognitive-Behavior 
therapy for Bulimia Nervosa. Behavior Modification, 13, 
340-360.
MANUSCRIPTS UNDER REVIEW:
Williamson, D. A. &, Watkins, P. C., & Schlundt, D. A
validity investigation of body image measures and
constructs.
Williamson, S., Williamson, D. A., Watkins, P. C. &. Hughs,
H . Group versus individual reinforcement contingencies 
for improving mathematics estimation .
Mood Congruent Memory 164
MANUSCRIPTS IN PREPARATION
Propst, R., Watkins, P. & Ostrom, D. Cognitive therapy of 
depression in a religious popul at,ion.
Watkins, P. C. A measure for assessing the acceptability of 
psychological explanations for problem behavior.
Watkins, P. C., Mathews, A., Williamson, D. A., & Fuller, R. 
Mood congruent information is more retrievable but not 
more accessible in depression.
UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPTS
Watkins, P. C. (1987). Consistency of menstrual symptoms 
in Premenstrual Svndrome patients.
Watkins, P. C. (1988). Test manual for the "Acceptabi1i tv 
of Psychological Etiology Questionnaire" (APE).
Watkins, P. C. (1988) The physiology of memory : A review of 
theories and research.
Watkins, P. C. (1990) Imcplicit versus explicit memory bias
in depression . (Dissertation)
RESEARCH IN PROGRESS
Watkins, P. C. The development of the "Food Automatic 
Thoughts Questionnaire" (FAT).
Watkins, P. C. & Williamson, D. A. Accept ab i 1. i ty of eating 
di sorders.
PRESENTATIONS
Gouvier, W. D., Watkins, P., Gallon, E., & Barkemeyer. C. 
(1988). Equivalence of items on the Mini-mental State. 
Paper presented to the Annual convention of The National 
Academy of Neuropsychologists.
Propst, L. R., Ostrom, R., Watkins, P. C., & Morris, M.
(1984). Preliminary report of the comparative efficacy 
of religious and non-religious cognitive-behavioral 
therapy. Annual convention for the Society for 
Psychotherapy Research. Banff, Canada, June, 1984.
Watkins, P. C., Mathews, A., Williamson, D. A. & Fuller, R. 
Explicit and implicit mood congruent memory bias in 
depression. Poster presented at the Annual Convention 
for the Association for the Advancement of Behavior 
Therapy , San Francisco, CA., November, 1990.
Mood Congruent Memory 165
Watkins, P. C., Williamson, D. A., & Falkowski, C. (1988). 
Late-Luteal Dysphoria: A controlled comparison of normal 
and clinical patients. Poster presented to the Annual
convention of the Southeastern Psychological Association.
New Orleans, LA., March, 1988.
Watkins, P. C., Williamson, D. A., & Falkowski, C. (1988).
Behavioral assessment of Late-Luteal Phase Dysphoric 
Disorder. Poster presented to the Annual convention of 
the Association for the Advancement of Behavior Therapy,
New York, New York, November, 1988.
Williamson, D. A., Davis, C. J., Goreczny, A. J., McKenzie, 
S. J., & Watkins, P. C. (1988). Development of a simple 
procedure for assessing body image disturbance. In D. 
Willi amson (Cha i r ) , Body image or body images?: In search 
of an elusive intervening variable. Symposium conduct ed 
at the Annual meeting for the Association for the 
Advancement of Behavior Therapy, New York, NY., November, 
1 988 .
Williamson, S. H., Williamson, D. A., Hughes, H. H., &■ 
Watkins, P. C. (1988). Group versus individual 
reinforcement contingencies for improving mathematics 
estimation in elementary school children. Poster 
presentation to the World Congress of Behavior Therapy, 
Edinburgh, Scotland, September, 1988.
RESEARCH INTERESTS
Information processing approach to unipolar depression: 
-attentional processes in depression 
-memory processes in depression
Cognitive and behavioral treatments of depression
Information processing approach to bulimia
Information processing approach to body image.
REFERENCES
Donald A. Williamson, Ph.D. 
Department of Psychology 
Louisiana State University 
Baton Rouge, La. 70803
W. Drew Gouvier, Ph.D. 
Department of Psychology 
Louisiana State University 
Baton Rouge, La. 70803
Vicki Pollock, Ph.D.
U.S.C.-L.A.C. Med. Ctr. 
1934 Hospital Place 
Los Angeles, CA. 90033
Andrew Mathews, Ph.D. 
Department of Psychology 
Louisiana State Univ. 
Baton Rouge, La. 70803
DOCTORAL EXAMINATION AND DISSERTATION REPORT
Candidate: Philip C. Watkins
Major Field: Psychology
Title of Dissertation: Implicit vs Explicit Mood Congruent Memory Bias In Depression
Approved:
Major Professor and Chairman
Dean of the Graduate School
EXAMINING COMMITTEE:
Ad—
JLG
Date of Examination:
October 25, 1990
